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Introduction

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Introduction

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There has never been a period in history in which deadly conflict between nations has been substantially eradicated from the face of the earth. Historically, international stability has been episodic and often achieved through wars that engendered widespread devastation. Since World War II, nuclear deterrence limited the intensity of conflict between the superpowers, but it did not prevent many other violent wars. The hope for a world without deadly conflict has typically rested on a utopian desire for world government. More recently, it has been suggested that deadly conflict among nations can be prevented without world government and the transcendence of the state system by the spread of freedom and democracy. Short of attaining either world government or global democracy, however, policy-makers have to work with the world of states as they are: often violent, autocratic, repressive, and sometimes impelled to acts of genocide.

In European history at least, there is only one period in which tension was largely absent from diplomacy—during the ascendancy of the Concert of Europe from 1818 to 1848. During that halcyon period, states of different political colorations and domestic institutions agreed to meet together to prevent the start of another round of Napoleonic Wars. The Great Powers met and consulted with one another, including a reformed France in their deliberations. Although this concert did not quell some nationalist revolts that broke out on the periphery of the system, the Great Powers remained in general agreement with one another until their unity was ruptured by the revolutions of 1848. From then on, the common desire to avoid conflict and war was shattered, reaching its final denouement in 1914.

The Concert of Europe represented the consolidation of an “encompassing coalition” of Great Powers in world politics. Such a coalition, however, could not be recreated after World War I due to the isolation of the United States, the abstention of Soviet Russia, and tension between France and Britain. Before long, fascism and communism created a huge divide in European politics, and Hitler found other countries willing to accept German gains achieved at their expense, mainly out of their fear of Communist Russia.

After World War II, the immediate outbreak of the Cold War prevented another coalition from being constituted and enshrined in the United Nations Security Council. The bipolar split prevented a general accommodation in world politics as the United States and other Western powers brought ex-enemy states into their system, and the Soviet Union communized the states it occupied.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era, and the truly remarkable character of the period since 1991 lies in the fact that all Great Powers now recognize the need to keep overall peace. They generally agree that important transformations should occur as a result of peaceful change, not through military force. Few countries (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is an exception) still believe that they can attack, occupy, and extinguish other nations by force of arms. They also agree on the importance of foreign trade and investment and participation in a world economy that permits factors of production (except labor) and products to flow easily from one nation to another.

Such factors could in time lead to the creation of a new world concert: an encompassing coalition of Great Powers, structured informally (in contrast to the Concert of Europe), settling disputes among themselves while monitoring and protecting the general peace. Such a coalition would include the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and hopefully China and Russia. Including China and Russia is imperative if the proposed concert is to be truly an encompassing coalition and not just a set of cooperative relationships among friendly and historically compatible states. Including China and Russia is also imperative if the concert is to be able to bring about a global peace and not lead to another polarization of international politics. It is true that for certain limited purposes such a coalition already exists in the form of the UN Security Council. However, the Security Council has been plagued by disagreements among its members over Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia and tends to be brought in to disputes as a last resort, leaving little room for flexibility in the member states’ positions. A new encompassing coalition would be more effective by including Germany and Japan, and its informal structure would help foster better relations among the Great Powers. The goal of this informal concert would not be to replace the Security Council, but rather to provide a more effective, conducive venue in which the Great Powers could reach decisions, which could then be enacted by the Security Council. This volume focuses on how such an encompassing coalition could be formed and how to induce the Great Powers, particularly Russia and China, to participate in it.

General Assumptions

An underlying assumption of this work is that similar domestic political and economic institutions and interests will probably continue to cement a link between the United States, Europe, and Japan. The open question is whether states with dissimilar political systems but some common interests, such as China (still a communist regime) and Russia (a nation in transition from autocracy to a more representative form of government), can be included. If they join, the first encompassing coalition in more than 150 years will come into operation, strengthening the general peace.

A second assumption is that there are underlying military deterrents to Great Power expansion. The distribution of military capabilities is quite unequal, with the United States retaining capabilities beyond those of other states. Even where this is not true, neighboring powers check and balance against most potential aggressors. Social deterrents also exist in the form of local nationalism and the inability of foreign invaders to govern occupied territory over the long term. Thus, we shall assume military disincentives to hostile action by major powers. This allows us to concentrate our attention upon the measures which might be taken to enlist states in an encompassing coalition.

Great Powers cannot simply force one another to cooperate. If there is to be agreement on common goals, it must rest on a combination of constraints (imposed by background deterrence) and volition.¹ This is especially true when attempting to create a new institutional arrangement in world politics. States do not join new groupings unless they feel it is in their interest to do so. The utility of "voice" or participation, in such organizations must be greater than that of "exit," or non-participation.

Accordingly, in the case studies and functional chapters which follow, we consider the use of economic and status incentives to influence states' behavior and specifically to induce Great Power cooperation (assuming a background of deterrence). Great Powers have to obtain some benefit from working with one another. The G-7, G-8, and European Monetary Union (EMU), for example, offer select benefits to the rare nation which is allowed to join their number. The benefit can also come, however, in the form of increased status in the international system for mere participation on an equal basis with other Great Powers in an informal setting.

Economic incentives are equally important. The hierarchy of economic decision makers in world politics is much more steeply graduated than the club of political decision makers. There are states whose military importance exceeds their economic importance. India, for example, will be consulted about regional security in South Asia, but it has not yet become a member of the economic elite and does not participate in their decisions. The Great Powers will be all the more

likely to participate in an encompassing coalition if their joining results in economic benefits from the increased trade, investment, and openness of foreign markets which will accompany such a concert, especially now when major power resources are determined by economic growth and stability.

It is nonetheless true that ad hoc, particularistic benefits alone will not induce reliable Great Power cooperation. Unless a normative structure underpins the operation of an encompassing coalition, it will not endure. The nineteenth century concert was initially motivated to keep conservative, legitimist regimes in power in Europe, intervening to support existing ones or to install new ones. Likewise, a present-day encompassing coalition needs an agreed-upon focus and a set of principled objectives to justify bearing the costs of its operation. The framework proposed here includes norms supporting the settlement of regional conflict, the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the increased liberalization and interdependence of the global economic system.

Can an Encompassing Coalition Be Created in the Twenty-First Century?

Can an encompassing coalition be created among Great Powers? The answer to this all-important question is a qualified yes. There is now an opportunity to create a new set of international structures and relationships that will make a new world concert possible. Prospects for global cooperation are a function of the relations between the major powers and only some historical eras provide opportunities for Great Power agreement and thus openings for the construction of durable global orders. International politics is typically marked by long, more or less steady patterns of conflict with little change, interrupted by short periods of dramatic change and upheaval. The ends of major wars are used as historiographic cutting points precisely because they demarcate historical epochs.

The ends of wars, especially major Great Power wars, create new bases of global order. In many ways, such cataclysmic events are the precursors of not only new constellations of power and interest but also major efforts to construct global orders. The Thirty Years' War resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia and what is widely recognized as the birth of the modern state system. The Napoleonic Wars were followed by the Concert of Europe and decades of relative tranquility insured by the cooperation of the Great Powers. Although the nineteenth century saw both the Concert of Europe and an initial set of international agreements and organizations, it later succumbed to military conflict. World War I led to greater, though less successful, efforts to create global order. World War II, which occurred only a generation after the "war to end all wars," and which clearly showed the failure of international organizations and rules to prevent war, did not dampen the perceived need for international

organizations to establish global order. Ironically, international organizations grew even in an ideologically polarized era and even as they proved helpless to deal with the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War is as profoundly consequential for international politics as the ends of earlier great wars between the major powers. It is also propitious in that the seeds of Great Power cooperation can now be sown.

New Factors in World Politics

The 1990s ushered in a new era in international relations. A bipolar Cold War ended after almost half a century. The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed international relations in a number of ways.

- First, an ideological contest that had lasted more than seven decades came to an end. The struggle between liberal capitalism and communism ended, and communist rule has largely disappeared. Where domestic differences remain, as in the case of the United States and China, they do not necessarily impede cooperation at the international level.
- Second, the Soviet collapse brought to an end the age of multinational empires. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires died early in the century and the colonial European empires ended by mid-century. The Soviet Union was the last great multinational empire and its collapse created fifteen states in place of one.
- Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the structure of world politics, for it constituted the implosion of one pole of a bipolar world. However short-lived analysts expect it to be, the world today is characterized as unipolar with the United States as the world's sole superpower.
- Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the collapse of a superpower that exercised regional and global influence, and this has left in its wake power vacuums in various parts of the world. These dramatic changes in global affairs set loose many disparate tendencies, but they hold great hope for the future.

Although the political orders that emerge following Great Power wars vary, the period following a major war is typically prosperous, notwithstanding the economic turbulence that ensues. Long-suppressed material demands and energy use are unleashed and combine with the domestic search for normalcy. Wartime barriers to trade and movement come down and this too fuels economic growth and recovery. The 1920s was such a decade. The two decades following 1945 were like that. Now we are again witnessing a great unleashing of economic forces which, although uneven, have been sustained for almost a decade. This opening guarantees that new organizations will certainly center on economic issues.

Integration and Fragmentation

On the one hand, the forces of globalization and integration gained momentum with the end of the Cold War. Even during the Cold War, technological and economic developments linked Western nations and less-developed states. There was dramatic growth in global trade and investment, with the attendant growth of a web of agreements and practices governing these areas.

The end of the Cold War made possible the expansion of these webs of agreement and exchange. The result is that interdependence has given way to globalization. Whole new parts of the globe can now be integrated into the world economy. Wars typically bring the greatest barriers to trade and the ends of wars typically lead to the reduction if not collapse of such barriers and the resumption of classical, normal, and less politically induced trading patterns. The end of the Cold War toppled one of the highest and most sustained trade barriers in world history.

At the same time, new developments in communication and information technology have vastly increased the scale and scope of instantaneous global communication. Vast amounts of information can be moved across the planet at unbelievable rates. The internet combines the developments of prior technologies and constitutes a dramatic transformation in global communications. Previous advances in communication proceeded along separate tracks. Point-to-point communication was embodied in the telegraph and telephone and later supplemented by broadcast communication, which could transmit first sound (radio) and later pictures (television) to a broad set of listeners. The internet combines point-to-point and broadcast capabilities and is now integrating pictures and sounds with text and graphics. It will make possible instantaneous global dialogue and will allow unprecedented access to information. Autocratic countries may try to inhibit internet communication for political purposes, but they certainly will not succeed.²

The combination of the growth in trade and investment with the communication and information revolutions underlies the phenomenon of globalization. Such globalization rests on an institutional foundation that includes the spread of global norms and constraints on the exercise of state sovereignty, and which facilitates Great Power agreement.

Simultaneously, however, there are evident tendencies toward fragmentation. Regional forces seem to be growing in importance. Indeed, even in an age of alleged economic globalization, regions as economic entities continue to retain their vitality and allure. Consider, for example, the ED's gathering momentum, as well as NAFTA, a projected FTAA (Free Trade Area for the Americas), and present discussions about Asian economic institutions. This economic fragmentation is matched politically and socially by the re-emergence of ethnic conflict and heightened demands for autonomy and self-determination. All of these factors suggest the presence of disintegrative forces in world affairs.

The key point, however, is that the fragmenting tendencies are largely located on the periphery of the international system. At the central core, or at least its economic core, the process of globalization is fostering the adoption of common norms and practices.

Alternatives to an Encompassing Coalition

In such postwar eras of flux and uncertainty, there is often debate and disagreement about the course of events: how best to understand them and how best to respond to them. In the early days of the Cold War there was no coherent framework, much less doctrine, with which to make sense of events. Rather, American policymakers responded discretely in an ad hoc fashion to unfolding events and only subsequently framed their actions in terms of the doctrine of containment. Once the doctrine emerged, it subsequently framed how actions were seen and reacted to.³

Today we are equally in search of an organizing doctrine that can describe the current system. The term “new world order” does not suffice because it leaves the impression that nations do not have to do anything to secure peace and stable economic relations—that these outcomes will simply be thrust upon countries by historic processes.⁴ In fact, peace is never maintained by organizational structures themselves. World War I gave rise to a plethora of international institutions, but nations did not animate them with sufficient efforts to secure peace.

Today even security analysts are unclear about the likely trend of events. The Cold War was barely over before the first bold predictions were being made: that the world was returning to the multipolarity it had known before World War I, and that the talk of the United States as the world’s sole remaining superpower was merely a brief “unipolar illusion.”⁵ In the process, it was said NATO had become an institution without purpose, having lost its enemy, and thus would wither and die, and the United States would shortly withdraw from Europe. Although some still anticipate this outcome, the prediction and the argument on which it is based have proven useless as guides to understanding recent events.

In our view, the present age holds great opportunity but requires clear vision. Great Power actions in recent years have been characterized by ad hoc reactions rather than by purposeful, clearly formulated strategy. The best prospect for world affairs in the short and medium terms lies in establishing a framework among the Great Powers. None of the proffered alternatives—the classical balance of power, a community of established democracies, an

empowered United Nations, institutionalism, collective security, or American hegemony—is an adequate basis for global order.

The *balance of power* is, “even at its best,” to quote Michael Doyle, a proponent of the “established democracies” strategy, “a poor form of international order to rely upon for international security. It may have ensured the survival of the Great Powers and somewhat reduced the number of wars, but it did so at the cost of a large investment in arms, the destruction of small powers, and a series of devastating Great Power wars.”⁶

A *community of established democracies* is also, however, an insufficient base on which to establish global order. Its justification lies in the observation that democracies have almost never fought one another during the last 175 years. Although this is not the place to go into the detailed debates in what is now an enormous literature on the democratic peace, an American policy which focuses on a community of established democracies would be both too exclusive and too expansive. At the moment, such a community would exclude the Great Powers Russia and China and would vitiate the role the United States has played in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, in emphasizing only the link between democratic states, we could recreate an ideological divide between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other that would largely reconstruct the ideological polarization of the Cold War. It would frustrate rather than facilitate extending the forces of globalization to new states.

At the same time, however, it is also too inclusive in that it would contain many lesser powers, states which would be given too great a voice for their size, resources, and ability to participate in international events, such as Uruguay and Costa Rica.

Still other observers commend the United Nations as finally being positioned to be the basis for global governance. In recent years, the UN has increased in importance and visibility. But it has done so largely because the Great Powers have had an interest in working through the UN Security Council. The UN works when the Great Powers agree, at least in the minimal sense of not blocking one another’s efforts. Indeed, descriptions of a successfully functioning UN system are descriptions of an extended concert of powers, which is our own proffered alternative. As explained above, however, the coalition being proposed here is designed to enhance the effectiveness of the UN by creating an alternative, informal forum in which rapprochements among the Great Powers can be reached more easily.

A fourth option that has received considerable attention since the end of the Cold War is *institutionalism*, that is, the idea that by participating in a variety of institutions, states will restrain their competitive behavior as they learn that they have more to gain by cooperating through those institutions. Although the logic of this approach is sound, and indeed quite similar to some of the arguments presented here, we would argue that institutionalism by itself is not enough—that it needs a concert of powers to sustain it. In the 1920s, for example, institutional-

ism ran quite high, and yet without a group of Great Powers at the head to introduce new nouns and ensure the continued observance of existing ones, it could not withstand the political and economic upheavals of the 1930s.

Another suggestion for the best system to keep the peace in the post-Cold War world has been *collective security*.⁷ However, not only have the only two attempts to achieve this failed, but it is simply unrealistic to think that states will reliably participate in a collective security arrangement without the legitimacy afforded it by some group or subgroup of Great Powers. Moreover, the coalition envisioned here will have the added advantage of engaging states on a variety of issues, not just security-related ones, thus increasing the opportunity for and benefits of cooperation. Finally some analysts have pointed to a “benevolent” *American hegemony* as the most realistic and effective framework for ensuring global peace and stability.⁸ However, the flaw with this option is clear in the vociferous opposition of numerous states, both great and small, to past American policy in a variety of situations where it has been perceived as acting unilaterally (such as Iraq after the Gulf War, and Kosovo, for example). Russia and China, as well as many states in the developing world, are openly resentful when the United States acts on its own. The United States may far outstrip any other country in military might, but its ability to be politically effective can be highly constrained by such resentment, raising serious questions about the long-term stability and effectiveness of a world order explicitly based on United States hegemony.

We believe that the prospects for global order are a function of the relations of the Great Powers. Cooperative Great Power relations lead to more general international cooperation and the creation of order, and conversely, conflictual Great Power relations generate international conflict. If the balance of power fails, as it typically has, it sows the seeds for war, by proxy if not by the powers directly. If Great Powers conflict, there are likely to be military clashes between Great Power allies on the periphery of the system as well as heightened tension at the core.

Great Power relationships increasingly involve the entire globe. Conflicts among the Great Powers spill over and engross other areas and determine much of international politics. The interests and domain of the Great Powers have become increasingly far flung and thus, when they clash, their struggle permeates the globe.

Not only are Great Power activities now worldwide in scope but they also have very intense effects. Their wars, whether hot or cold, are world wars. And even when their conflicts are cold, the tensions between them spill over into economic relations. Thus, as successful as the United States was in establishing an economic order in its own sphere following World War II, this order was

confined to half of the globe and did not include areas controlled by the other superpower.⁹

Strategies of Influence to Create an Encompassing Coalition

The goal of this project is to examine how best to create such an encompassing coalition of Great Powers. To that end, we have structured our investigation to look into the major ways of influencing states' behavior, that is, of inducing them, especially Russia and China, to join an encompassing coalition.

Incentives

As we have already noted, Great Powers establish new relationships when they have incentives to do so. Status and economic incentives can be very important in inducing reticent states to participate. Japan and West Germany were socialized to Western values and capitalist practices in part because of the new economic, political, and status benefits they received in joining Western councils.¹⁰ Incentives do not always work, however, just as their opposite-sanctions-do not always succeed. Sometimes countries do not need economic benefits from another Great Power or feel they are doing fine with their own strategies. Leonid Brezhnev's Russia, for example, was not tempted by the economic incentives offered by the United States. Lyndon Johnson's Mekong Delta development scheme did not, divert the North Vietnamese from pursuing their nationalist and military objectives in the South. It is still an open question whether economic incentives offered to Jiang Zemin's China will bring about a strategic rather than simply a tactical shift in Chinese policy toward the rest of the world. Sanctions may sometimes isolate a "rogue state," thereby encouraging a change in policy; North Korea and Vietnam are cases in point.

Status incentives are sometimes equally or more important than economic ones. While Brezhnev could do without Richard Nixon's proffered economic aid, he was enormously gratified to be considered "equal" to the United States. This is a point worth remembering today-when economic incentives have failed with contemporary Russia. Status incentives, which the West is neglecting, have proven to be even more important to Russians than their economic counterparts, and there are some indications of their value to China as well. Status incentives have also been important in Europe. To be sure, joiners of the EU, and now the even more exclusive EMU, have gained actual and prospective economic benefits. But how does one measure the political importance. of joining the most important club in the world? Finland and Sweden, as well as Portugal and Spain, have all seen their status and political centrality rise as a result of their entry into the club. .

Emulation

The Great Powers affect other states not only through their ability to coerce and induce other states but also through others' self-conscious emulation of Great power practices. As some of the chapters in this volume demonstrate, states adopt the practices of successful Great Powers. Great Power innovations diffuse. Prussia's use of railroad mobilization during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was analyzed and adopted by the other Great Powers. Indeed, even the Prussian general staff was adopted as a model. During the 1930s, fascism too had an impact on the practices and values of other nations.

Emulation is not limited to military techniques and the security arena—it is also evident in economic policy. In earlier eras, domestic and international economic policies seen as successful were copied by others. In recent years, the success of market capitalism and international openness have led to their diffusion. In addition, the emulation of Great Powers is not limited to small states but is evident in the practices Great Powers borrow from each other.

Norms and Institutions

Incentives and the emulation of successful states will not in themselves create a stable international order, however. Unless the new practices and modes of behavior are deemed appropriate and can be instituted as "norms," and perhaps later institutionalized, nations may adopt them selectively and follow them haphazardly. Stable orders require norms and institutions in addition to selective incentives.

Many international institutions require adherence to an interlocking set of behavioral injunctions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) commit their members to openness and tariff reduction, the extension of most-favored-nation benefits to other countries, and freedom for capital to flow in and out of their markets. Countries which do not adopt the entire package suffer. The recent Asian financial crisis may be a case in point. The concatenation of required behaviors is best illustrated by what is perhaps the greatest agent of social, economic, and political change among nations, the European Union. To join the EU, and even moreso to join the more exclusive EMU, a country must be a democratic and peaceful 'state, having already settled any possible border conflicts with other states. Internal government deficits must be less than three percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Exchange rates and interest rates must be stable. The total government debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP. Furthermore, nations must commit themselves to maintain tight control of fiscal policy through a "stability pact."

Commitment to norms and membership in institutions are also, of course, no guarantee that a state will become a loyal supporter of a peaceful and economically open international order. Countries differ in their support for such arrangements and their adherence can be spotty and not sustained. Even after a major power seemingly complies with the principles and norms involved in joining prestigious political and economic clubs, it can decide to abstain later. Hitler's Germany was briefly a member of disarmament bodies, as well as the League of Nations, but withdrew when she had accumulated enough strength to stand on her own. It is possible that Russia and China could accept blandishments from Western and developed countries and later decide to go it alone. Norms and institutions by themselves do not impel cooperation, as the record of the 1930s amply demonstrates. If, however, the continued economic progress of one or more key countries were dependent upon their participation in a worldwide web of markets, economic organizations, and linkages to generate foreign investment, then it would not be so easy to withdraw. The Soviet Union withdrew from the Western economic system, despite its experimentation with the New Economic Policy in 1921–28, and that decision was a fateful one. While for a period, huge investment in heavy industry was able to increase the Soviets' military power, that distortion of resources eventually undercut Russia's civilian economic, agricultural and technological foundation. The core of its mobilization base became a hollow shell. China does not want to see this happen and is leery of following ill-fated Soviet precedents. .

It is thus the interlocking character of norms and institutions that provides the best prospect for sustained cooperation and the maintenance of a global order.

The Challenges Ahead

In short, we believe that in this era following a global conflict, the prospects for global cooperation and conflict lie in the relations between the Great Powers. Constructing a Great Power concert would make possible the establishment of a cooperative world order and truly global international organizations. The failure to do so and the emergence of Great Power conflicts will lead to heightened tensions and divisions with their concomitant consequences.

The eras following global wars also set some of the agenda Great Powers perforce confront. Wars are immensely destructive phenomena and leave generic problems in their wake. First, there's always a question of how to deal with the defeated Great Powers. Charles Doran's argument about post-hegemonic outcomes can be appropriated as a starting point of reference. Doran argues that Great Power wars have resulted in over-, under-, and controlled assimilation of states bidding for hegemony. Underassimilation is problematic for it allows Great Power challengers to return (as occurred with France following the 1713

Treaty of Utrecht). Overassimilation is problematic for it generates unstable power vacuums and paves the way for another's bid for hegemony (as Doran argues occurred with the Peace of Westphalia, 1648). Controlled assimilation involves the reintegration of Great Powers to fulfill their historic geographic economic and military functions but on terms that sustain rather than challenge the existing global order (as Doran argues occurred as a result of the Congress of Vienna, 1815).¹¹ Statesmen took the central lesson of the first half of the last century to be that the treatment of Germany at the end of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II. As a result, the reconstruction and reintegration of Germany and Japan were core components of the United States's strategy following World War II.

The current challenge is how to deal with Russia. The country has experienced enormous hardship and decline. The critical concern immediately voiced at the beginning of the 1990s was how to avoid a Russian Weimar. At the end of World War I, the German government was replaced and a brief fragile and tragic experiment in democracy began in Germany. The Weimar Republic constituted a brief interlude before an assertive revisionist, nationalist dictatorship came to power. Similarly, many now wonder if Russian democracy will give way to a nationalist government blaming the country's problems on outsiders and claiming that the nation was stabbed in the back by those who allowed in the pernicious foreign influence. It is no small irony that average Russians now revile the United States in a way they did not do during the Cold War.

The second generic issue raised at the end of major conflicts is whether the winners hold together or split over the issues of spoils and postwar policy. The coalitions that fought World Wars I and II fragmented. Revolution in Russia led to its departure from the war effort during World War I and because of the exclusion of its former allies, Russia played no role in constructing the postwar order. The United States entered the war late but refused to join the international organization championed by its president and eventually played only an economic role in 1920s and 1930s Europe. Following World War II, the grand coalition split as the Soviet Union and the West found they had political, economic, ideological, and geostrategic differences.

The challenge today is whether a new coalition of nations can be created in the absence of a common foe. Substantial differences and tensions surfaced during the Cold War in the economic, political, and military relations of members of the Western alliance, but their common military interests dominated and overwhelmed their divisions. Their current challenge is to sustain their links now that the glue of a Soviet threat has dissipated, if not entirely departed.

The third challenge, one rarely dealt with in immediate postwar periods, is how to deal with the evident challenges on the horizon. Any system of Great Powers is subject to shocks, sometimes substantial ones. New Great Powers rise

and old ones decline. German unification in 1870 transformed European politics. Conversely, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has similarly transformed international politics. The current movement toward European unification may lead eventually to a single Great Power in Europe. In addition to recombining, and disintegrating states, changes in relative power among the great states themselves affect the Great Power club. The growth of German power was the defining political problem in Europe for more than half a century. The growth of Soviet power posed a similar problem after World War II. Currently, the rise of China is generating a host of comparable questions and concerns.

The resolution of these issues has profound implications for global governance. The maltreatment of the losers in the last great contest, the falling apart of the victors, and the inability to incorporate new aspirants generated postwar global orders built on deterrence and conflict, with the attendant waste of resources, recurrent crises, and the possibility of war. In contrast, the best prospects for global order come from the equitable assimilation of the defeated, the maintenance of an alliance of victors, and the incorporation of rising powers.

In short, the best prospects for global order, both for security and prosperity, lie in sustained good relations among the Great Powers. This implies that the key challenges today entail sustaining Western ties, integrating Russia as a Great Power in the global community, and engaging and integrating China as well.

Plan of the Study

In the chapters that follow the authors explore how best to establish a Great Power concert. The investigation centers on two different, yet related, processes. In the first, states use sanctions and economic and status incentives to influence the policy of another state. Once enough states have changed their behavior, the new policy develops into a norm of expected behavior, thus reinforcing the target state's policy change, as well as spreading the behavior to other states. Finally, the most successful norms become institutionalized and continued in new organizational formats. The second process focuses on institutions as the generators of norms, rather than the final codification of them. In this version, states consciously form institutions with adherence to particular norms as the entry criteria. The institutions offer economic and status incentives to get countries to join, and in return, the member states agree to abide by the prescribed norms.

The conclusions gleaned from this study will help to formulate an array of techniques that might be used to create an encompassing coalition in world politics, and particularly to enlist the efforts of China and Russia in making such a coalition successful. As already mentioned, we assume that background social, economic, and military deterrents operate to constrain hostile and particularly military action by Great Powers. This means that the primary policy task is to create incentives which will make joining an encompassing coalition more likely.

For the case studies, it would be desirable to find influence cases which pertain only to Great Powers. Unfortunately, there are not enough of them in the present era, and current or near-contemporary cases (as opposed to eighteenth- or nineteenth-century cases) are required to reflect the forces and structure of the world system at the moment. Thus we have turned to smaller-power cases as well to observe the success or failure of incentives in causing a change in national behavior.

In part I, we present a range of case studies of attempts to influence particular states' behavior through sanctions, economic incentives, or status incentives. The first two cases examine the United States's record in using incentives to influence the Soviet Union, the first comparing the failure of economic incentives embodied in the Marshall Plan and those offered during the *détente* period, and the second evaluating the attempt to shift Soviet policy under Mikhail Gorbachev. The next case examines the West's relationship with China after Deng Xiaoping came to power, seeking to find evidence of successful influence techniques that might be more broadly applied at the present time. Finally, in smaller-country cases we deal with the mixed success in relations with North Korea and Vietnam and the failure to influence either Iraq or Iran.

In part II, we turn to the influence of international regimes and organizations. The unilateral influence techniques discussed in part I may be intrinsically less effective than those mounted by a multilateral organization. Here we examine two cases of regime or institutional influence, one primarily economic and one security-related: the influence of the European Union; and the influence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its informal associate, the Missile Technology Control Regime. We also consider the role of Great Power concerts in the past and the possibility that the formation of overlapping clubs today could lay the foundation for a new concert. '

In part III, we turn to the inculcation of new norms. What new norms have been developed to guide national practice, and have these norms been generally observed? Here we examine the renaissance and emergence of norms of economic openness, including "convertibility," "capital mobility," and IMF "conditionality"; and the norms of "transparency" and "intrusiveness" that are now being accepted in both economic and security relationships. We ask how successful these norms have been in further codifying and reinforcing altered national behavior. In this section, we also examine another means of transmitting norms: emulation. We first look at the historical record on the influence of emulative techniques, and then turn to the specific record in the Middle East.

In part IV, we examine the possible present-day applications of our findings, most specifically what the United States can do to bring Russia and China into such a coalition. Because of different perspectives and ranges of expertise among our research group, we offer different approaches to the future of China: one more

focused on economics, and two different views of the ultimate results, one more optimistic than the other. We then turn to the prospects and possibilities of bringing Russia into an encompassing coalition of world powers.

It is, of course, obvious that influence strategies fail as well as succeed.¹² Some states, unaware of their economic limitations, are immune to economic incentives. Some countries feel they already have sufficient status or that, as in the Iraqi case, they derive more regional status from denying the requests of larger states than from cooperating. In addition, techniques that work with small powers may be ineffective with major states. And if particular underlying deterrents are absent or insufficient, behavior change through positive incentives is not likely. functionally In more general terms, however, we conclude that the movement from unilateral to multilateral incentives, norms, and structures appears to be useful in enlisting members in an encompassing coalition. The world is now in the process of creating new high-prestige and selective clubs in the fields of economics, politics, and even the military. Once enough of these clubs overlap (regionally and functionally), they will form a linked structure that could combine into an encompassing coalition, with the latter representing the sustaining cooperation developed in separate regions and issue areas.

Notes

1. This point is made about the Concert of Europe by Henry A. Kissinger in his *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

2. For the implications of the internet and other communications revolution, see Cherie Steele and Arthur A. Stein, "Communications Revolutions and International Relations," in *Conflict, Cooperation and Information*, edited by Juliann Emmons Allison and Glenn A. Oclassen, Jr., Series on Global Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

3. Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).

4. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

5. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17 (1993): 5.

6. Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: Norton Press, 1997): 93.

7. See, for example, Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security* 20: 1 (Summer 1995): 52–61.

8. See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998): 43–78.

9. Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984): 355–86.

10. There was also the threat of the Soviet Union, which led them to ally with the United States. On the other hand, at any point after the 1960s, Japan and West Germany—fully mature and prosperous states—might have decided to embark on their own diplomatic and even military courses separate from America, but did not do so.

11. Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

12. See particularly Alexander George, “Strategies for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Scholarship for Policymaking,” *Political Science Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (March 2000): 15–19.