Ethnicity, extraterritoriality, and international conflict

Arthur A. Stein
Department of Political Science, UCLA
stein@polisci.ucla.edu

Abstract
The world has more ethnic groups than states and many ethnic groups are split across two or more states. One implication is that many ethnic conflicts are international phenomena in which transborder ethnic kin are involved. States concerned with co-ethnics or co-religionists in neighbouring countries are pursuing interests not included in our standard models of international politics. States that pursue such extraterritorial interests define national security and national survival in terms broader than merely maintaining the physical and territorial integrity of the state. Threats to their ethnic and religious brethren are seen as threats to them. And because such threats are seen as particularistic they also affect foreign policy alignments and the functioning of the balance of power.

Keywords: Ethnic conflict; irredentism; threat perception; national interest; security; balance of power

Introduction
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. (Adam Smith)

If lives and health of our compatriots are in danger, we won’t stay aside. (Leonid Slutsky, head of a Russian parliamentary committee in charge of relations with ex-Soviet republics, speaking at a meeting in Crimea, Ukraine, Feb. 25, 2014)

Ethnic conflict is a major element of modern politics. The once hoped for decline in ethnic differences as a key element of social differentiation, predicted by theories of modernization and development did not occur and brought renewed interest in ethnicity (Esman 1977; Hechter and Levi 1979; Smith 1981). The end of the Cold War constituted a shift in the strategic landscape that resulted in ethnic conflict becoming a major focus of inter-state relations.
Most political violence in the current global political and economic setting occurs within countries and comes in the form of inter-communal conflict that endangers internal and international stability. Disparate literatures study intercommunal conflict on secession, civil war, rebellion, and ethnic conflict and in each there is a predisposition to treat such conflict as a feature of domestic politics to be explained by internal characteristics alone. Writing about internal conflict in general, Kalyvas (2010, xii) notes that “comparative politics scholars have tended to down-grade transnational and international factors affecting domestic political conflict”. Scholars of civil war decry the predominant emphasis on a “closed polity” model (Gleditsch 2007) and note the inclination “to treat civil wars as purely domestic phenomena” with a consequent neglect of “transborder linkages and processes” (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009, 404). Writing about ethnic conflict in particular, Angstrom (2001, 60) notes as “a problem with some studies” being “the tendency to treat it as something uniquely internal”. Yet as argued below, ethnic conflicts sometimes originate abroad and are often sustained from abroad. This requires a focus on diffusion and on the international dimensions of ethnic conflict.

Ethnic conflict has drawn the attention of international relations scholars who argue that their traditional approaches provide a theoretical framework for explaining such conflict in a manner similar to that used to explain interstate war. Since “the collapse of imperial regimes” in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could be seen as resulting in “an emerging anarchy”, the standard tools of realism could be applied and most specifically that the security dilemma could be used to explain ethnic conflict (Posen 1993, 27). Alternatively, ethnic conflict is simply treated as one of a class of conflicts, that include war, that are explainable by the same set of characteristics. These are costly conflicts and are explicable by one or more of the features that explain costly conflicts, and ethnic conflicts in particular result from a commitment problem (Fearon 1998).

Much the same is true for religious conflict. It has received renewed attention as a source of conflict and is typically treated as an internal matter. Here, too, there is a debate about whether our standard perspectives on international politics can explain religious conflict.

This paper argues, however, that ethnicity, as well as religion and ideology, constitutes an extraterritorial interest, and, as such, represents an important phenomenon that requires some modification of our core assumptions about the nature of international politics. More specifically, this paper argues that core state interests include extraterritorial elements of identity. This makes possible the incorporation of ethnic, religious, and nationalist interests in state behaviour and an assessment of their impact on international relations. This reconceptualization of state interests generates important modifications in standard propositions and arguments about the requisites for international stability. And it is this reconceptualization that
constitutes an important element in our understanding of ethnic conflicts and their development.

**Ethnic groups and ethnic conflict**

The world has many more ethnic and ethno-linguistic groups than states. Estimates of the number of ethno-linguistic groups range from 5,000 to 6,800 (Gellner 1983; Carment 1993), whereas the UN has 193 member states (Growth in United Nations membership 1945–present, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml). Using a criterion requiring an ethnic group to make up 1 per cent of a country’s population, Fearon (2003) finds 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries as of the early 1990s. In only about one-fifth of countries did one group constitute more than 90 per cent of the population, but one group did constitute a majority in 71 per cent of countries. That disjuncture drives many features of domestic and international politics and political science scholarship in comparative politics and international relations.

One implication is that few states are homogenous and many if not most countries must be multiethnic and thus embody, even if not tolerate, a multiplicity of cultures, languages, and religions. Irrespective of competing definitions of ethnic homogeneity or mono-nationality, only a minority of states fit the description. Nearly two-thirds of 227 communal groups have kindred in another country (Gurr 1993); and 42 per cent of major ethnic groups are split among two or more states (Nielsson 1985). It also implies that they contain the possibility of ethnic competition if not conflict. Scholars thus debate the viability of polycultural or multinational states and which distributions of ethnicities and which institutional arrangements are more or less conducive to ethnic cooperation. They also debate whether the system of nation-states is bound to experience continued fragmentation and new state formation (Rosecrance and Stein 2006).

Given the process by which state boundaries were created as well as the movement of people, a second implication is that many ethnic and religious groups have co-ethnic and co-religionists in neighbouring countries. When ethnic populations are not circumscribed territorially within states but exist across state borders, such linkages can affect both domestic and international conflict. The substantial empirical work addressing ethnic conflict can be found in disparate literatures devoted to secession, irredentism, civil war, nationalism, as well as ethnic conflict, and although there are scholars who treat these as discrete domestic phenomena largely unaffected by international factors, others note the role of international politics in inter-communal conflict. Disparate data sets, conceptualizations, specifications, and time periods generate somewhat different results about the extent of internationalization. For
example, using a relatively small minimum casualty figure for characterizing civil wars, only 5 per cent are considered internationalized, whereas a data set using a higher threshold finds 25 per cent with foreign interventions (Gleditsch 2007, 295). In another study of armed internal conflicts, approximately one in eight had interventions by neighbouring states, constituting 2/3 of the cases with external interventions (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005).¹¹

But external involvement need not involve intervention. Support can come in the form of financial and military assistance and the provision of sanctuary for fighters as well intervention. The empirical data make clear that many internal conflicts experience some form of external involvement (among others, Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). In one study of armed internal conflicts, about half had forms of external assistance short of intervention (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005).

The evidence from a variety of studies using different data sets, conceptualizations, and specifications is that ethnic groups often receive support by ethnic kin in neighbouring countries. Scholars use a variety of terms for the situation: transborder ethnic affinities (Horowitz 1985), transnational ethnic alliances (Davis and Moore 1997), ethnonationalist triads (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009), transborder ethnic kin (Cederman et al. 2013), and even foreign constituencies (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011).

There is substantial evidence of a link between ethnic ties and conflict. In general, certain ethnic distributions are associated with inter-state conflict (Huibregtse 2010, 2011), and cross-national ethnic kin increase the likelihood of international conflict (Davis and Moore 1997; Trumbore 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006) and the contagion of intrastate armed conflict (Brown 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Lobell and Mauceri 2004; Gleditsch 2007; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Forsberg and Karlén 2013). Transnational ethnic kin is a determinant of external support (Saideman 2002; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Recognition of the role of ethnic kin is such that it is included as a control in any attempt to assess other factors affecting the international spread of civil war, as for example in Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006).

Quantitative studies often articulate hypotheses about likelihood of support or intervention in a conflict under different conditions without articulating an analytic logic. Most studies, explicitly or implicitly, emphasize instrumental material factors. Yet the very fact that we observe ethnic kin in neighbouring countries to be the basis for both intra-state and inter-state conflict leads to a recognition of the impact of affective factors.¹² Not only do states support ethnic kin in neighbouring states, but they do so even when

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they themselves have ethnic minorities and thus vulnerable to secessionist move-

The evolution of the literature has entailed finer distinctions in the situations which give rise to the internationalization of ethnic conflict. Discrimination against one’s co-ethnics or their rebellion brings the issue of external support or involve-
ment to the fore. An important survey finds 275 communal groups in 116 countries that are disadvantaged and characterized as “minorities at risk” (Gurr 2000, 12). The relative power of groups and the ability to affect an outcome play a role. Scholars fo-
cus on situations in which a discriminated against ethnic minority has ethnic kin that control a neighbouring state as the case most likely to generate external support and intervention (Davis and Moore 1997; Woodwell 2004; Saideman and Ayres 2008).

That governments are concerned with ethnic kin in neighbouring countries, with their treatment and conditions, requires a modification of our conventional concep-
tions of state interests.

International relations theory and the territorial state

The study of international relations is a conflict riddled landscape of competing lev-
eels and units of analysis and warring isms. A review of the scholarly debates, grand and not so grand, is beyond the purview of this paper, but suffice it to say that ev-
eryone recognizes the centrality of the state and of interests in the explanation of both foreign policy and international politics. The state is the dominant actor in in-
ternational relations and other actors, whether individuals, interest groups, non-state actors, or international institutions (which are really intergovernmental institutions), matter to the extent that they affect states and their policies.

Whether scholars emphasize the structural constraints of an anarchic system, or provide place for the domestic requisites of regime survival, or highlight the so-
cially constructed aspects of nationality and sovereignty, their explanations of state behaviour begin with a focus on interests and the presumed primacy of security and survival. The national interest is thus a touchstone concept and the compelling core of the scholarly understanding of international relations is that states pursue their interests in order to assure their continued existence and counter external threats. Even assertive, aggressive, and offensive actions are typically undertaken to assure security. The maintenance of the physical and territorial integrity of the state is the core national interest (Krasner 1978).

The preeminent raison d’État is to assure survival against foreign threats. States act to ensure their own survival in the knowledge that no supranational institution or governing authority will protect them and that they cannot rely on other states to assist them even if they share a common ideology, political form, or ethnos. Other countries are assessed for their threat potential,
which derives from their foreign policy intentions and their relative power. Any state’s concern is with others’ foreign and defence policies, and only those domestic practices that affect these. Otherwise, there is presumed to be no concern with the domestic policies of other countries. Structural realists find all domestic politics irrelevant, whereas liberal institutionalists argue that political systems matter because they affect the relative ability to mobilize resources from their societies and because democracies and autocracies have different aggressive propensities. The point is that the domestic politics of other countries matters only in so much as it affects foreign and defence policy.

Such a view of the defining character of international politics is consistent with the absence of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. After all, the purpose of having one’s own country is to be able to establish communal institutions and practices apart from those of others. Having a state makes possible the pursuit of ways of life political, social, and economic apart from others. States are concerned with their autonomy, their ability to make independent decisions.

Yet states have historically demonstrated extraterritorial interests even while espousing a view of sovereignty that makes states the sole arbiters of their internal arrangements. Even when they do not have external consequences, states regularly display a concern with one another’s internal arrangements and domestic affairs that are incomprehensible within a narrow self-interest framework. A preeminent concern with national security should generate no interest in extraterritorial ones.

The extraterritorial concerns of states include an interest in ethnicity and religion, yet our standard models include no sense of the role these play in the interests and interactions of states. Concern with ethnic kin and involvement in neighbouring states with ethnic kin cannot be explained in our standard model. Indeed, the same point can be made about the role of religion and ideology.

**Extraterritoriality and an alternative formulation of state survival and security**

The argument developed here, however, is that a reconceptualization of what constitutes national security and state survival is required. Assessing the impact of ethnicity and other extraterritorial interests requires a reconceptualization of the core interest of states.

Most important, the key assumption that states preeminently value survival is itself in need of more precise specification. Although typically treated as the territorial survival of the state, the full meaning of survival is never specifically elucidated and is presumed to be consistent over time and space.
My own argument is that for many states, survival also includes a political (ideological), or cultural (ethnic, religious, and national) component, or both. It is often argued that nationalism is not a long standing and deeply rooted phenomenon but a thoroughly modern and constructed one (Seton-Watson 1977; Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). But this is often said as if the force can be readily ignored or transcended. Not only is nationality a human artefact, so are states, ethnic groups, religions, ideologies, etc. That they are constructed does not mean that they can be reconstructed at will. All of these human creations are exclusive rather than inclusive, have great resiliency, and have become elements of individual identity. Thus, just as international relations theorists take the existence of states as given, so an analysis of religion and nationality and ethnicity can take their existence as given.

For many states, survival has more than a purely territorial connotation; it encompasses political, cultural, and ethnic considerations. And the international environment poses threats that are more than physical and territorial. After all, territory is not destroyed by warfare or conquest and factories and farms are typically reconstituted. And with the exception of genocide, only a relative minority is ever threatened physically. Rather, political and cultural autonomy are endangered. States define survival as encompassing an entire way of life. States are interested in guarding a people and preserving a way of life. States therefore respond not just to threats posed by military power but to cultural and political threats as well.

For those who root state interests in human nature, the case for an expansive conception of survival is straightforward. History is replete with examples of people voluntarily giving their lives for causes and ideas. Physical survival has hardly been the preeminent motive force for all human beings all the time. Were individual survival the preeminent consideration, mass armies would be more difficult to create and sustain, and individuals would not voluntarily swamp induction offices at the start of wars. It can be argued that it is the knowledge of their mortality and eventual death that is the basis of individuals’ interests in the survival of more transcendent phenomena embodied in their offspring and kin. Human beings are distinguished as the animal that would fight and die on behalf of others with whom they do not share genetic material. Individuals care about passing on their cultural values, or memes. In short, a typology of state interests that is rooted in individual interests would necessarily require a more expansive notion of what individuals are willing to die for and how states define survival.

Moreover, even a conceptualization that begins with the irreducibility of states confronts the problem that states are more than territorially bounded entities. They are institutions that embody different principles, including notions of legitimacy and mechanisms for arriving at a social choice. States in which sovereignty resides in a dynasty embody different conceptions of survival than states in which popular sovereignty reigns. The implications of
the social choice mechanism are the basis for arguments about the different war propensities of representative governments from monarchical ones. Not surprisingly the survival of the state encompasses more than physical and territorial integrity.

In many if not most states, citizens and elites see the state as more than simply an entity controlling a particular land mass. \textsuperscript{24} “Better dead than red”, for example, captures a US conceptualization of survival that extends beyond the maintenance of territorial integrity and includes the political character of the state. In other countries, citizens and elites alike see the state as embodying other ideational features, not typically characterized as ideological, but as ethnic, national, and cultural. The emergence of nationalism in nineteenth-century Europe caught the imagination of many, including Jews who had managed to survive for almost two centuries as minorities in states dominated by other religions and peoples (Ben-Israel 2003). Zionism was a political means for assuring the survival of Judaism by providing a homeland free of persecution. Israel was constructed as a Jewish state and the survival of the Israeli state means the survival of Zionism and of a place for the in-gathering of Jews from around the world. Palestinians have, at times, proposed the creation of a secular state in Palestine in which Jews and Arabs could live freely. Such a proposal would not constitute a threat to Israel’s survival if survival was defined purely in terms of the physical and territorial integrity of the state. The Israeli view of proposals for a binational secular state as tantamount to the liquidation of Israel, however, constitutes a more expansive view of survival. Indeed, our conventional models have no ability to explain the importance of concerns about diaspora Jews to Israeli foreign policy, or that of ethnic Germans to German foreign policy, or that of ethnic Russians to Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{25}

The centrality of such concerns can also be seen in the domestic actions states take during wars. If states were solely concerned with the provision of the collective good of security against outside attack they would not treat many insiders as outsiders. Ironically, even as states often extend their protective concerns to those physically outside the state (citizens as well as ethnic and religious kin), they also exclude from such protection those inside the state who are deemed outsiders. It has not been unusual to see states expel people from within their borders when they come under attack. Even the US sequestered US citizens of Japanese descent during the Second World War. Ethnocracies sometimes force migrations of ethnic minorities in the hope of creating monoethnic states.\textsuperscript{26} Obviously, the central state concern with providing protection against outside attack does not extend equally to all those within the territorial boundaries of the state and does not necessarily exclude those outside the territorial limits. In effect, there is some consideration of identity and belonging which extends beyond territorial location.\textsuperscript{27}
The very conception of citizenship, regardless how conferred, captures the point that a state’s concern extends to classes of individuals regardless of location. Expatriate citizens constitute state interests in a way that resident aliens do not. And the fact that some states automatically extend citizenship to individuals with certain characteristics (Israel and its law of return, which grants automatic citizenship to any Jew, and Germany’s basing citizenship on bloodlines) amplifies the point about the extraterritorial concerns of certain states.28

Extraterritoriality and international politics

The alternative perspective offered here suggests an international system composed of states that are heterogenous rather than undifferentiated. Some are pure territorial states that are functionally equivalent. Others reflect extraterritorial concerns, including religion, ethnicity, and ideology. The latter define their survival in terms of specific extraterritorial interests.

A heterogenous system embodies more sources of conflict than a homogenous one. A homogeneous system of purely territorial states would see border and boundary disputes but would make it possible for states to ignore one another’s internal policies and practices. Further, as boundaries become accepted and fixed (Zacher 2001) and as territory declines in relative economic importance (Rosecrance 1986), one would expect fewer international disputes. In fact, an inductive historical survey of issues that give rise to wars finds a

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* Frequency of issues as percent of wars, i.e., percentage that a particular issue contributed to the origin of wars in the period.
constant concern with strategic territory and a declining role for territorial disputes that exclude strategic territories (Holsti 1991, presented in Table 1).

In contrast, a heterogeneous international system generates additional sources of conflict. States with extraterritorial concerns of ideology, ethnicity, nationality, and religion come to blows over one another’s internal political arrangements and their international implications. Those with ethnic, national, and religious counterparts in other nations are affected by the repression of their brethren elsewhere.

States come to support separatist movements and alternative territorial arrangements as a way of resolving such conflicts. Their extraterritorial concerns can lead to irredentism, an irredentism focused less on the recovery of ancestral homelands than on the incorporation of a region in which one’s ethnics is concentrated (even if rooted only in a recent migration). In such cases, it is the extraterritoriality of ethnics or nation that generates territorial disputes absent geopolitical and strategic considerations. Thus, in Holsti’s (1991) analysis of the conflict-producing issues that have been sources of war, issues of ideology, religion, and ethnicity rise in importance even as purely territorial issues decline (see Table 1). The confluence implies that not all wars in which territory is an issue are disputes that would have occurred absent ethnic, religious, and nationality considerations.

States that are either ethnically homogenous or ethnocracies dominated by one ethnic group and that find some of their members living in significant concentrations abroad tend to pursue foreign policies that reflect this concern for the ethnics. Concern with the status of group members abroad generates an extraterritorial dimension to foreign policy and a concern with the domestic politics of other states concerns that become magnified when those other nations do not assure the protection of minority rights. Such states’ foreign policies are not wholly driven by considerations of relative power. Threats to an ethnic minority in another nation become important security concerns that reflect more than mere territoriality.

Such ethnic interests can also constrain the extent of hostility (absent an expectation of victory in war). That is, extraterritorial concerns can mute and dampen traditional balancing behaviour for fear of jeopardizing group members living abroad. In such cases, extraterritoriality makes possible deterrence by way of holding hostages.

States are also concerned that changes in the internal politics of their neighbours will affect their own internal politics. Changes in the dominant ethnic, religious, or ideological faction in one’s neighbours can have tremendous consequences for oneself (Nelson 2014).

The historical data make clear the elements of continuity and change that have characterized extraterritoriality. In earlier eras in the inter-state system, religious conflicts were regular occurrences, whereas ethnicity and nationality had yet to exist as salient political factors. In the years between the end of the
First World War and the end of the Cold War, religious conflicts disappeared as causes of war and the ethnic concerns that only emerged after the Congress of Vienna continued and grew in importance (Holsti 1991, presented in Table 1). In the post-Cold War world, ethnicity and religion have played a larger and growing role in intrastate conflicts (on religion: Ellingsen 2005; Toft 2006; Fox 2007).

**Extraterritoriality, threat, and the balance of power**

In a heterogeneous international system in which some states pursue extraterritorial interests, the bases of threat are expanded. The traditional realist argument is that states view adverse changes in the distribution of power as inherently threatening and respond, either by internal mobilization or external alignment, in ways that reestablish a balance of power. Yet, states find other changes threatening as well.

States can find internal political changes in others threatening (or less threatening) even absent changes in relative power. The rise to power of a totalitarian universalistic ideology, even in a relatively minor power, is recognized immediately as a threat by other countries. The universalistic aspirations, especially when combined with its totalitarianism, generate immediate concern among other states, not even necessarily neighbouring ones.

Monoethnic and monoreligious states, or states clearly dominated by one religion (theocracies) and ethnicity (ethnocracies), and nationalistic states have all generated concerns among their neighbours in those cases in which ethnic, national, and religious lines did not match territorial ones. A nationalistic Germany in the 1930s immediately created fear among neighbours with substantial populations of ethnic Germans.

Extraterritoriality affects not only threat perception but also foreign policy alignments and, as a consequence, the prospects for the functioning of the balance of power. Extraterritorial interests not only can form the basis of conflicts of interest separate from geopolitical calculations but also determine the nature of threat assessment and response. Ironically, even realists, such as Walt (1987), who emphasize that states balance against threats rather than power, downplay precisely those factors ideology, religion, and ethnicity that are the basis of threat assessments separate from power.

Expansive foreign policies dominated by particularistic (non-universalistic) extraterritorial concerns do not generate the balancing behaviour traditionally described by international relations theorists. Territorial expansion driven by ethnic interests does not generate balancing responses on the part of other great powers because the threats posed by such states are seen as circumscribed by their extraterritorial concerns. A Germany interested in the incorporation of ethnic Germans need not pose any threat to one without ethnic Germans. A Russia concerned with the reincorporation of ethnic Russians
poses a threat to some but not all of its neighbours. Thus, whereas alliances built on perceptions of common threat might be created by certain changes in the balance of power are not constructed when there is an asymmetric sense of threat posed by expansive extraterritorial concerns. The relative growth of German power in the late 1930s was quite clear, but the nature of its aspirations was not. As long as it was seen as a racist state bent on bringing together ethnic Germans, its territorial ambitions were seen as directed primarily eastward. Further, German racialism could be seen as more hostile to Slavs than to fellow Anglo-Saxons (indeed, the basis for periodic German references to a BritishGerman arrangement for Europe). Thus, the coalition constructed to oppose Hitler awaited German aggression clearly not aimed at reuniting ethnic Germans.  

Inter-state wars rooted in ethnicity thus typically attract only states with populations of the relevant nationals and do not generate standard balancing behaviour in response to aggression. It is the local distribution of power (between states in the region) that interacts with the territorial distribution of ethnic groups (how they are divided across borders), and with the nature of domestic political arrangements (ethnocracy or not) to shape and constrain state policies and determine regional stability. 

In contrast, the emergence of a universalistic ideology in another state is quite quickly and immediately seen as a challenge and threat and generates countercoalitions even absent major changes in the balance of power. The threat posed by a Communist Soviet Union was felt in many countries, including those quite far from the military reaches of the Soviet Union. And there was an immediate coalition formed to contain the spread of Communism even when the USSR was weak. Something similar occurred in the Arab world with the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran. The arrival of the ayatollahs in Teheran, although immediately weakening Iran economically and militarily, also generated fears throughout the Arab and Muslim world (Nelson 2014). Indeed, Iran pursued policies similar to those of the Soviet Union, encouraging and supporting revolutionary fundamentalists elsewhere. And those states responded in concert and out of all proportion to actual Iranian military might. Such states are seen as expansive and threatening even when they are not in a position militarily to export their revolutionary ideas.

Conclusion 

The prospects for international order and stability are profoundly affected by the pursuit of extraterritorial interests by the states that compose the international system. In our conventional model of international politics, the balance of power preserves order and maintains stability. But that model
presumes that a preeminent state concern with security and survival is primarily about the maintenance of the physical and territorial integrity of the state.

States, their elites and citizens, have an abiding interest in security and survival which also encompasses political ideals, nationality, ethnicity, and religion. These elements of identity constitute affective interests and are reflected in threat perceptions and international responses. Thus, changes in domestic political arrangements absent any change in the international balance of power can be seen as threatening. And because such threats are seen as particularistic they also affect foreign policy alignments and the functioning of the balance of power. Nation-states encompass some territory with a set of residents and extant resources and capabilities, but given that their borders do not circumscribe their affective concerns, they have extraterritorial interests that transform domestic practices in one state into international concerns of others. Ethnicity and ethnic conflict embody this extraterritoriality.

Notes

1. The same point can be made about the predictions of secularization theory about the declining importance of religion (Fox 2012).
2. For the impact of the end of the Cold War on regional conflicts, see Stein and Lobell (1997), and for the impact on civil wars, see Kalyvas and Balcells (2010).
3. Cross-national studies of ethnic conflict find mixed results using a variety of measures of both ethnic fractionalization and concentration as well as mixed results attempting to reduce such conflict to economic inequality. A particular problem of closed polity approaches that focus on purely material considerations is that they point to determinants of ethnic conflict that would preclude any basis for external involvement by co-ethnics. For an example of one such model, see Caselli and Coleman (2013).
4. One can compile along list of references discussing in one form or another the neglected international dimension of ethnic conflict stretching from Ryan (1988) to Carment, James, and Taydas (2006).
5. Ethnic conflict resurfaced in the 1990s as a major topic in the study of international relations, as once again, real-world events drive the interests of scholars and set an agenda for the field.
6. For a characterization of the factors that explain costly conflict, see Fearon (1995).
8. Connor (1972) finds the percentage under ten, Nielsson (1985) finds it just slightly more than 25 per cent.
9. The breakup of multinational empires in the last century has affected the geo-political distribution of different ethnic groups. For the impact of the breakup of the Soviet Union, see Harris (1993).
10. The paper references a small proportion of the relevant empirical literature. Scholars with multiple contributions, only some of which are referenced, include Carment, Cederman, Davis and Moore, Gleditsch, Regan, and Saideman.

11. For a discussion of the internationalization of communal conflicts since 1945, see Gurr (1993). Also see Checkel (2013).

12. This distinction was originally made by Suhrke and Noble (1977) and developed by Heraclides (1990) and Carment (1993). Others who point to emotional attachments and affinities include Regan (2000) and Carment, James, and Taydas (2006).

13. It should be noted that states also intervene on behalf of ethnic groups for strategic and not just affective reasons (Biddle, Friedman, and Long 2012).

14. The key assumption of neorealism is that in a self-help system, “states seek to ensure their survival” (Waltz 1979, 91, 105). Comparably, Wendt’s (1999, 198) constructivism defines the national interest as consisting of four needs of which two are physical survival and autonomy.

15. A core assumption of John Mearsheimer’s (2001, 31) “offensive realism” is that security is the most important objective of states and “that survival is the primary goal of great powers”.


17. For an argument that identity need not be defined versus another, see Lebow (2008).

18. This perspective contrasts sharply with those in which states pursue ontological security by actions intended to secure moral, humanitarian, and honour-driven self-identity needs (Steele 2008).

19. In this sense, ethnic fear is something that is embedded in different identities and political competition and does not require the construction of “aggressive social identities”, as argued by Arfi (1998).

20. The argument can also be put in terms of the interests of governing elites. Elites are interested in retaining their positions of power. And certainly, they take their political survival very seriously. But even their survival entails broader issues. Kings, for example, were not only interested in their own personal survival but in the maintenance of the monarchy.

21. Morgenthau, a classical realist, as for example, roots his view of realism in a conception of human nature.

22. More recently, the survival argument for individuals is made at the level of the gene. Individuals have an interest in the survival and success of their genes and thus sacrifice on behalf of offspring and kin.

23. Note that individuals vary. There are those who chose to die rather than convert to another religion. Others chose conversion, and still others pretended to convert and continued to practice their religion covertly. Presumably, survival was at issue for each of these types, but that they weighed different aspects of survival differently or assessed the probability of successful covert practice differently, etc.


26. On forced migrations in central European history, see Stola (1992); and on the migrations that follow the collapse of empire, see Brubaker (1995a).

27. Ironically, most jurisprudence is territorially demarcated and has had great difficulty with incorporating extraterritorial constructs (Note 1990).

29. Nationalism as used in this essay refers to a concern with co-nationals living outside the state. It can also refer to the idea that national groups should live in or be represented by a state.

30. Horowitz (1992) discusses the neglected connection between irredentas and secessions. On the pattern of relationships between national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands in the new Europe, see Brubaker (1995b). Rothschild (1981) argues that state-supported secessionist movements are the form of politicized ethnicity most problematic for international politics (in contrast to ethnicities partitioned among other states, and in contrast to pan movements and diasporas). A reading of the contributions to Chazan (1991) reveals some scholarly disagreement about the cases to which the label irredentism would apply.

31. Even with the assurance of minority rights in representative political systems, the resilience of ethnicity and the continuing role of diasporas suggest a continuing identification that forms the basis of interests and calculations.

32. Carment and James (1995) find that crises characterized by an irredentist setting are more likely to have a high level of perceived threat.

33. Although of peripheral concern in this paper, the extraterritorial concern of ideology has also grown in importance.

34. It can be argued that other universal ideologies have been seen as a threat to elites, but as long as they are not totalitarian and acceptant of pluralism, they are not seen as threats to societies.

35. Nationalistic is used here to refer to a concern with nationality. Nationalists are those who struggle for statehood. But once statehood is achieved, nationalists press for the in-gathering of nationals from foreign lands, sometimes through expansion.

36. See Pfaff’s (1993) argument of Nazism as a totalitarian universalistic ideology. For a discussion of the impact of nationalistic aggression on international politics, see Williams (1994).

37. Note that the same would be said of theocracies, unless they were proselytizing ones.

38. See Nelson (2014) for an excellent delineation of the extraterritorial impact of revolutions in international politics.

39. The lack of overlap is the basis for Connor’s (1978) argument about the modern nation-state and for the clever title of his article.

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