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Conclusion

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As we begin the twenty-first century, we have a rare opportunity to learn from the lessons of past conflicts and to use them to create a stable and peaceful world order. The international system has not yet solidified after the disruption of the end of the Cold War, with theorists and policymakers still arguing over whether a system emphasizing American hegemony, balance of power, global collective security, or growing institutionalism would be the safest and most secure option. However, because of the ever-increasing interdependence of world affairs, the global reach of the Great Powers, and the vastly increased destructive capacity of modern armaments, any clash between the Great Powers would have devastating effects on the world as a whole, in economic as well as military terms. Thus a fundamental premise for the future must be that world order will be based on the cooperative interactions of the Great Powers. If successful, these interactions will lead directly to the creation of a Great Power concert.

Our inquiry into international concerts showed that current world conditions fulfill most of the essential criteria for the establishment of such a concert: (1) agreement among major powers to avoid war; (2) ideological agreement on economic growth and stability; and (3) a balance of power in the system as a whole. Here, therefore, we highlight those factors which lead us to believe that a present-day concert would be a successful and long-lasting one. In addition, we answer the realist critics who contend that no concert can work in an anarchic world, as well as the pessimists' contention that China and Russia will never play a constructive role in such an encompassing coalition. Finally, we summarize the findings of the project's case studies with regard to how states can influence the behavior of other countries and layout the processes by which a system of concert norms can be developed and extended to help ground the encompassing coalition.

The Time Is Ripe

Critics of a concert approach contend that the odds are against a successful Great Power concert because the only one that ever succeeded was the short-lived Concert of Europe. However, we would argue that current conditions not only favor the development of a concert but, indeed, are different enough from those that produced the Concert of Europe to suggest longer-term durability and influence for a present-day concert.

As we saw in the chapter on concerts, ideology was a key factor in both the creation of the European concert and its demise. The Great Powers were drawn into the concert by their common- conservative ideology and their shared objective to protect their regimes from revolution. The first significant crack in the concert occurred when Britain deserted that ideology. Thus, a necessary element for the formation of a Great Power concert is a common ideology to tie the powers together. Today, the ideology which could animate such a concert is that of economic and political modernization, avoidance of Great Power war, and economic growth as the means to advancement. This ideology already exists (and even China recognizes its force, though it wishes to control premature political change at home). This is a fundamentally different ideology from that which motivated the old Concert of Europe. Whereas the latter's goal was to stifle the inevitable process of political change, today's liberalizing ideology is forward-looking, and values change. Whereas the Concert of Europe's efforts to repress change ensured its ultimate demise, a present-day concert built around principles of economic liberalization would grow and adapt to the changing international situation. Today's encompassing coalition, to borrow President Bill Clinton's words, is on "the right side of history."

Another difference between the present-day international situation and that of nineteenth-century Europe is that the economic relations among the Great Powers are considerably more advanced and far-reaching now than they were then. Then, each Great Power relied in large measure on its own sphere of states for resources, markets, and trade: Britain had its colonies, Prussia, Germany was focusing on Central Europe, and Russia was mainly engaged with the small states on its borders. Now, however, not only are the trade relationships among the Great Powers far more developed and intertwined, but several of them have lodged production facilities in each other's territory. American, European, and Japanese companies all have physical assets within each other's borders, as well as in China and to some degree in Russia as well.

Yet another difference between then and now is that one of the assumptions underlying Great Powers' actions in the nineteenth century was that if a state could just get big enough, it could become self-sufficient within its own sphere of influence. In the early twenty-first century, that assumption has been turned on its head. States now need a belief in political smallness and an openness to the outside world to succeed. Power is now derived more as a function of economic

reach and influence than of military might and conquest, and all of the Great Powers recognize that the best way for them to increase their power is by participating in the interdependent global economy.¹

Finally, another factor which undermined the Concert of Europe but which would strengthen a present-day concert is the offense-defense military balance. The technological innovations in transportation, communication, and armaments in the mid- to late nineteenth century gradually convinced states that a quick war might be both possible and successful, leading them to emphasize offensive preparations and thus aggravating the security dilemma and torpedoing what remained of Great Power procedural cooperation as Europe split into opposed alliance blocs. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, nuclear weapons changed the balance back to defense dominance (or retaliatory dominance), again discouraging the Great Powers from offensive war.

Realism and Concerts

Realist approaches, however, suggest that the Great Powers can never remain united for an extended period. Sooner or later the balance of power will reassert itself and states will be divided into competing alliance blocs. "Balancing" always triumphs over "bandwagoning."² This depiction cannot be substantiated historically, however, as Paul Schroeder demonstrates. Neither Louis XIV nor Napoleon confronted united Great Power opposition to their conquests.³ During the nineteenth century, alliances were frequently used not to oppose external states but to constrain alliance partners. Nor did concerts break up solely because of power rivalries in the absence of other contributing factors. The Great Powers worked together to resolve the question of Belgian independence in 1830-31 and the issue of Mehmet Ali's attacks on the Ottoman Empire in 1839-41. The success of these interventions brought England and France back together.

Another claim pressed by the realists is that long-term cooperation among Great Powers is ruled out by their relentless pursuit of "relative gains" in respect to each other. Key work by Bjorn Lomborg, Duncan Snidal, Arthur A. Stein, and others has shown that this concern is at minimum overemphasized. Some countries pursue absolute gains for long periods of time.⁴ In other international systems when numbers of major players exceed two, relative gains concerns decline.⁵ Finally, game theoretic simulations have indicated that players with too-great insistence on maximizing relative gains will often lose comparatively to absolute-gains players.⁶ Thus, far from relative gains making cooperation among states impossible, many studies attest to its continuing viability.

A final realist contention is that influence in the international system only proceeds through power relationships. The countries with the greatest power get what they want. In other words, "might makes right." If this were true, then

international behavior would be determined by military precedence. In 2030, China might lead the international system, followed by the United States, a United Europe, and then Japan. India and developing countries would fill up the list. The “sinization” of world politics would then be in full flower.

This conclusion, however, is too simplistic. Outcomes and norms in international politics are not a product of power alone but of long-term agreement on values. In one of the most important transitions in modern international politics, the United States came to world power essentially embracing British political and economic norms. With the exception of imperialism, America was co-opted to participate in an essentially British vision of the world economy and internal politics. As one salient example, the “Four Freedoms” enunciated by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 derived from Sir Alexander Cadogan’s preliminary notes and observations. The League of Nations and later the United Nations were revisions of essentially British ideas.

Economist Deepak Lal argues that the world has recently returned to the 1870 British international economic system.⁷ If so, in the future, “ideas” will matter as much as power in the lexicon of world relationships.⁸ If China and Russia imbibe immanent international norms through institutional participation and emulation, their role in the system may possibly be constrained or even “constitutionalized” in the way in which the United States’s power was brought to serve a wider purpose after 1945. A primary objective is to induce China and Russia to join a twenty-first-century version of a world concert of powers.

Even if power relations determined outcomes, however, the present system of international relations provides for balance among the Great Powers. With five great agglomerations of economic and military power (the United States, China, Russia, Europe, and Japan), no one group can preponderate. An overbalance of power occurs only when all five act together. The United States is the single strongest power, but it is also the least imbued with desires for territorial aggrandizement. Europe (the European Union) may grow in strength economically and through an expansion of membership, but these changes will take place peacefully and with the support of other states. Japan is scarcely a territorial revisionist. Russia and China cannot expand without the agreement of local Great Powers in their neighborhood.

Russia and China

So if conditions today are ripe for a Great Power concert, and if a concert can work in theory, the main remaining argument against the encompassing coalition being recommended here is the empirical question of whether Russia and China could ever be constructive members of such a concert. As a rising power with a rapidly expanding economy and increasingly prominent nationalist tendencies,

many warn that China will inevitably become an aggressive power in the East Asian region.⁹ As evidence of the danger inherent in Beijing's rising power they point to China's missile tests off Taiwan, its contentions over the Spratly Islands, its challenging of American positions regarding Iraq and Kosovo, and its campaign to gather sensitive information on nuclear weapons and satellite launching technology. Beijing has demonstrated its resistance to U.S. surveillance flights, and it remains extremely touchy on the subject of Taiwan. However, this pessimistic analysis is far from conclusive. Indeed, according to Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, the most notable characteristic of China's present policy is its many unresolved contradictions. For every instance of nationalism and irredentist sentiment, there are countervailing examples of moves toward further economic interdependence and participation in the world economy. Despite these contradictions, however, there is considerable evidence that China is slowly becoming a more cooperative member of the international community and that it could play a crucial role in a future encompassing coalition of Great Powers.

While it is true that China has been more amenable to participating in multilateral institutions in the economic sphere than in the security realm, there is reason for optimism regarding the latter as well. China has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its inception in 1994.¹⁰ In addition, Beijing has also spent the last decade trying to improve its relations with most other countries in the region and played a critical role in bringing about the UN-sponsored elections in Cambodia.¹¹ Chinese nationalism is primarily a tool for securing its domestic legitimacy, and observers contend that in a head-to-head contest with the requirements for economic growth, the latter will win out.¹²

As for China's military modernization program, the actual figures shed a more optimistic light on Chinese intentions. In 1996 Chinese army spending was estimated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) to be between \$35.5 billion and \$44.4 billion. This includes Western estimates of off-budget items. In the same period, Japan, which benefits from the American nuclear umbrella as well as the United States-Japan Security Treaty, spent \$45 billion. Estimates of Chinese purchases of advanced technology from Russia between 1990 and 1996 range between \$1 billion and \$2 billion, compared to the United States's military spending of \$12 billion with a single defense contractor.¹³ This is not to say that Chinese military spending raises no danger to regional security, but it does raise questions about the specter of an all-powerful Chinese military raised by the China pessimists. Of course, if the U.S. moves to deploy national missile defense, this will downgrade Chinese deterrent capability and lead to an increase in Chinese ICBMs.

In addition, there is evidence that one of the key factors determining Beijing's level of compliance with various international norms and treaties is the degree to which it has been involved in creating the rules it is being asked to

observe.¹⁴ Beijing has generally complied with non-proliferation regimes in which it is a full member—including NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (though not yet the MTCR). In missile transfers to Iran and Pakistan, Beijing has been seeking to get Washington to comply with the 1982 Joint Communiqué on Weapons Sales to Taiwan.¹⁵

In regard to Kosovo, Beijing has long argued that the UN, much less NATO, does not have the right to intervene in internal affairs of sovereign states. But aside from the possible precedent of intervention in Tibet or Taiwan thereby set, China worried that Washington's use of NATO troops was a means of avoiding a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council. Washington's end run around the Security Council served notice that China's views were not being respected.¹⁶ The conclusion to be drawn from China's opposition to NATO's action in Kosovo then is not that China will always be obstructionist. Rather, it suggests that China may abstain until it is included in a viable encompassing coalition of Great Powers.

Of course, China might have opposed NATO's Kosovo action even if it had been a full participant in such a coalition. The fundamental point is that none of the powers in such an encompassing coalition should expect to prevail on every issue. They certainly did not do so in the nineteenth century. Powers, therefore, must expect to lose on some questions. Their "voice" in such a coalition has to be as or more important than winning on every question. For a new concert to be successful, the United States will have to recognize that it cannot always pursue unilateral policies if it does not prevail in concert debates. In other words, if the United States wants China to sacrifice some of its autonomy for the greater good of cooperation, then Washington must be prepared to do so as well.

Russia's incorporation in an encompassing coalition or concert of powers raises different problems from China's. It needs to be a member because of its nuclear stockpile, its Great Power history, and its immense potential once it gets back on its feet, not its present strength. And yet, given domestic uncertainty, it is questionable whether it could be a cooperative member of a coalition even if it wanted to be. Russians also partly reject the liberalizing and modernizing ideology that much of the rest of the world accepts. From Russian perspectives, Moscow has followed a plan dictated to them by Western economists for ten years, and now it has brought them is a "beggar rubber-ruble economy."¹⁷ Consequently, the first step in bringing Russia into such a coalition will be to convince Moscow that economic liberalization can still work. This will not happen until Russia's economy is rescued from corruption and the control of economic oligarchs—the only ones who have profited from Russia's economic chaos.¹⁸ Vladimir Putin is seeking internal economic reforms that will permit substantial foreign investment.

Even if reform succeeds, however, will Russia cooperate with a coalition whose policies differ from Russia's on issues such as Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, and NATO expansion? Russia has not been able to exert its voice on many issues. It

has not been consulted before precipitate Western action. Indeed one of the central reasons for the controversial Russian deployment in Pristina in advance of NATO troops was Russian anger at having been ignored by the West. NATO was ready to send troops into Kosovo before reaching an agreement on the makeup of the peacekeeping force with Moscow.¹⁹ As one Russian official who participated in the talks described Russian perceptions, "One can feel disdain for the interest of Russia from the atmosphere of the talks."²⁰ And Washington's behavior on other issues hasn't helped matters. From NATO expansion, to arms transfers, to Caspian Sea oil pipelines, the United States keeps referring to its "partnership" with Russia, but all Moscow perceives is Washington presenting it with demands that it accept American positions on the issues. This process has, if anything, accentuated under the presidency of George W. Bush.

As Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko have shown in their chapters on the Soviet Union, Moscow has a long history of valuing its status as a Great Power and as an equal in the international arena. That history, combined with the nature of Russia's recent complaints against Western policymaking, suggests that Russia would indeed be interested in participating in a more-equal partnership in an encompassing coalition. Moreover, Moscow played a largely constructive role in urging both Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic to reach agreements with the West in spite of its own concerns. This indicates that its role in a balanced concert could well be a constructive one.

Case Study Results

In the past chapters, we have examined means by which attitudinal and behavioral change occurred in a series of case studies. Tables 19.1 through 19.3 show that some nations have been influenced by a combination of status and economic incentives, some by status incentives alone, and a number by emulation. Where the possibility of joining an international organization was involved (it was not in most cases), new powerful institutions beckoned and did provide or require some meaningful behavioral and attitudinal change in national policy.

The powerful examples of attitudinal and behavior change occurred when economic and status incentives induced states to adopt new norms, when these norms were also abstracted (emulated) from exemplar country behavior, and when they were institutionalized as well. The European examples are the most fully developed in this respect. Further, the European oases are one of the few sets of norm creation as a result of prior institutionalization. (This process also takes place, however, in regard to the WTO, and IMF.)

Table 19.1. Country Cases

	Economic Incentives	Status Incentives	Sanctions	Emulation Process	Institutionalization
Marshall Plan	Failure				
Brezhnev Doctrine	Failure	Success		Failure	
Gorbachev New Thinking	Success	Success		Success	N.A.
North Korea	Success	Partial Success	Failure		N.A.
Vietnam (Cold War)	Failure	Failure	Failure		
Vietnam (Post-Cold War)	Success	Success	Success	Success	N.A.
Iraq	Failure	Failure		Failure	N.A.
Iran under Shah	Failure				
Iran, Post-Shah	Failure	Failure	Failure		N.A.

Table 19.2. Regimes

	Economic Incentives	Status Incentives	Sanctions	Emulation Process	Institutionalization
EU	Success	Success		Success	Success
NPT			Partial Success	Partial Success	Partial Success
MTCR			Partial Success	Partial Success	
IMF	Partial Success	Partial Success		Success	Success
Nineteenth Century		Success		Success	Partial Success

Table 19.3. New Norms

	Economic Incentives	Status Incentives	Sanctions	Emulation Process	Institutionalization
Russia, 1996-97	Partial Success	Partial Success	Partial Success	Partial Success	
19th Century Free Trade	Success	Success		Success	N.A.
WTO Free Trade	Success	Success		Success	Success
EU	Success	Success		Success	Success
19th-Century Concert		Success		Success	Partial Success

Behavior Modification

The case studies show that economic incentives do not generally work by themselves. Status incentives have to be involved for behavior modification to occur. They show the general but not complete ineffectiveness of economic sanctions taken by themselves. Where bolstered by emulation and other sorts of incentives, however, they may occasionally succeed, as in the case of post-Cold War Vietnam. Institutionalization is not self-enforcing unless other methods are also involved. The IMF did not get debtor borrowers generally to live up to the standards of conditionality imposed upon them. This, however, was partly because many debtors recognized that they would get the money anyway.

Regime Success

Regimes succeeded or failed for similar reasons. Regimes which did not provide adequate status or economic incentives did not succeed. Even where such incentives were involved, regimes did not prevail if no sanctions existed to prevent backsliding behavior.

Normative Growth

Norms caught on where emulation occurred. But they were unlikely to remain in place if not ultimately supported by new institutionalization. Clubs help to reinforce norms. If emulation patterns changed, norms broke down or did not command adherence.

Summarizing, it is worth stressing all three stimuli to normative and behavioral change: (1) countries received economic and status benefits when they adhered to new norms; (2) the behavior of exemplary countries did not differ from, but instead inculcated or reinforced the norms; and (3) the norms were institutionalized in some way. In the 1930s the norms of the League of Nations system not only were not fully supported by economic and status incentives, but leading countries (such as Germany and Japan) did not obey the norms. In contrast, one of the strengths of the post-Cold War system is that the leading countries—the United States, Japan, and Europe—have typically followed the immanent norms. Institutionalization has supported the norms and has even given rise to the formulation of new norms (the norms for joining EMU, for example), which in turn have had a wider impact.

Although the focus here has been on influencing Chinese and Russian behavior, the case studies did yield useful information about how to deal with another prominent issue in today's world—rogue states. The rogue state cases examined (North Korea, Cold War-era Vietnam, Iraq, and postrevolutionary Iran) showed overwhelmingly the failure of economic sanctions as a single tool. The only case of success for sanctions was post-Cold War Vietnam where the target had lost its Soviet sponsor it had grown dependent upon. Virtually never were status incentives offered to these states (postrevolutionary Iran being the one possible exception). This potential option raises new possibilities, given that one of the commonly accepted characteristics of a rogue state is that it derives influence from its "outlaw" character. But this may not be fully accurate, as the changing policy of Libya, formerly a rogue state, suggests. One may have to find means of bringing rogue states back "in from the cold."

The Influence of Overlapping Clubs

One general conclusion reached in the prior analysis is that exclusive, discrete international clubs do not provide effective international governance of states, whether they are rogues or more traditional countries. In the world today we have European clubs, American clubs, and Asian clubs, with only a limited overlap among them. The G-8 bridges Europe, North America, and (to some degree) Asia. OSCE links Eastern and Western Europe. The IMF brings in southern countries as well as northern clubs. If a formal link were forged between EU and NAFTA, this could improve economic decision making on a general basis. NATO already provides an important military connection between North America and Europe. The PFP brings in Eastern as well as Central Europe, including some nations from the former Soviet Union. President Clinton proposed a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) but the project was stillborn because of the lack of "fast-track" negotiating authority from Congress.

While this proposal languished, Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) has proposed links with the EU. If these emerge, and FTAA is eventually accepted, there will be a new bridge between the European and American continents via MFN. There is also the possibility (as Paul Volcker has proposed) of currency relationships between the dollar, the euro, and the yen, establishing bands of accepted fluctuation in their relative value.²¹ If consummated, these new linkages would make the world easier to govern as a whole. The establishment of such overlapping clubs would offer status and economic benefits, the communication of norms, and their embedding in an institutional setting.

An Extension of Club Memberships to Russia and China

It would not necessarily follow, however, that even the proposed extension of club memberships would serve to bring Russia and China into an encompassing coalition of nations, a new concert for the world. Both resisted Western and NATO policy in regard to Kosovo even though President Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin helped to negotiate the final settlement. China did not veto the United Nations Security Council resolution that established the future of Kosovo. Broadly speaking, both nations resented and opposed policies which would allow either NATO or UN intervention in questions of internal politics such as Tibet or Taiwan in the Chinese case or Chechnya in the Russian case. While Russia is far more open than China to democratization pressures, neither favors what to them appears to be a violation of internal sovereignty.

More than this, the institutional linkage uniting Russia and China with fully formed international clubs is weaker than in other cases. China participates in the ARF under ASEAN. It is a member of APEC and will soon become a member of WTO. But there is no security organization which unites China with either the Western Hemisphere or Europe. Russia is a member of PFP and the new enlarged NATO Council, but it is not a member of NATO. Its membership in OSCE accords it status with fifty or so other lesser countries. In G-8 Russia participates on an equal basis in political discussions but not economic ones. The G-7, from which Russia is excluded, still remains the central core. Russia is not in the WTO, nor has Russia been accorded a relationship with the EU, the most dynamic and enlarging club in the Euro-Asian region. It is not just that Russia's economic relationship with the West and Japan has been left to languish—it is also that its status has been undermined as a result of (1) the expansion of NATO to involve countries which are suspicious of Russia; (2) the expansion of NATO military and bombing operations (without consultation) against its traditional Serbian ally; and (3) the establishment of a derivative role for Russia in the UN-

NATO occupation of Kosovo. Command arrangements did not reestablish Russian autonomy in this respect.


Clubs and Norms

Club memberships for Russia and China have to enjoy the same status as those for the United States, Europe, and Japan. Russia and China in part work against the Western international club structure because they have not been fully admitted to it. This problem remains to be solved.

If the membership problem can be solved, the process of creating a greater overlap in jurisdictions also facilitates the diffusion of common norms. As clubs overlap, the norms which they institutionalize become similar. As the empirical cases demonstrate, the norm origination process can go in two opposed directions. As stressed here, the creation of linked clubs (and institutionalization) can create new norms of operation, which then are disseminated to nations through emulation.

Institutionalization → Norms → Emulation

There is also a process that starts with economic and status incentives which reinforce a particular pattern of behavior. Norms are then abstracted (through emulation or otherwise) from this behavior, and then they can be institutionalized.



States can use economic or status incentives to induce countries to behave in a particular way. However, even if the target state has changed its behavior, it has done so only out of its immediate self-interest. To achieve longer-lasting results, the same behavior must be elicited from numerous states, creating a pattern of behavior. Once a pattern of behavior is relatively widespread and becomes the expected way to behave, it could become a norm that is generally observed. Then institutionalization will become possible as it did with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Vienna Convention, and the GATT/World Trade Organization.²²

In the future, economic and status incentives are likely to be increasingly distributed by international organizations to potential members. Those who wish

to join will see what norms they must accept and through negotiation or autonomous action will adjust their domestic and international policies accordingly. The most notable of these examples have been WTO, NATO, and EU. To join each organization, potential member countries must upgrade their domestic and international behavior to accord with standards in the favored organizations. At this point, neither Russia nor China has been admitted to the inner sanctum of such clubs-in part because their domestic economic and political behavior does not fully qualify them-but that process may not be long delayed. As it transpires, there will be a much better chance that Moscow and Beijing will come to play a constructive role in the emerging concert of powers in world politics.

It needs to be stressed in conclusion that extending high-status memberships to nations that in the past have pursued recalcitrant policies will not achieve a satisfactory result in the governance of the world. Admitting Saddam Hussein to Western organizations without change in Iraqi policy would achieve little and risk much. There must be symmetry between what is happening at the international and domestic levels. Domestic modernization and economic change must take place concurrently with international socialization and membership. Afghanistan is scarcely ready for membership in regional or international cooperative organizations. Cuban internal policy does not accord with the requirements of GECD, nor does that of North Korea. For reliable behavior modification to occur, the international and domestic levels must reciprocally interact. Chinese domestic change suggests a greater symmetry with international standards and will eventually bring China's inclusion in the international community. If, however, that change were to be reversed, international memberships would be affected. That is why the negotiations for Chinese membership in WTO are so important. If the process of opening continues and strengthens, it can be capped with status memberships in the international community. If the process of domestic opening falters, even when memberships are held out, then Chinese international socialization will be delayed as it was after the Tiananmen episode in 1989.

It is premature to forecast the ultimate outcome of such changes, internationally or domestically. What can be said, however, is that peace depends upon symmetric domestic and international socialization of Great Powers. Not all major powers are democratic (China is the paramount example). The world economy has not brought internal transformation along capitalist lines (Russia is the signal case). Yet the processes of liberalization are working in both states. At some point they will need to be reinforced by memberships in an encompassing coalition of major powers-a new world concert. If this can be created and sustained, the prospect of deadly conflict will greatly decline.

Notes

1. See John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State.: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

2. See Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

3. See Paul Schroeder, "The Nineteenth-Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?" *Review of International Studies* 15 (April 1989); Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994); and Richard Rosecrance and Chih-cheng Lo, "Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (December 1996).

4. See Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984).

5. Duncan SnidaJ, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (September 1991); and "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation, Reponse," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993).

6. This is the essential lesson of R. Axelrod's *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984) and also of Bjorn Lomborg's "Nucleus and Shield: The Evolution of Social Structure in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996); and Lomborg, "International Cooperation and Relative Gains: A Game Theoretic Formulation and Simulation," paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994.

7. See his essay in John Mueller, ed., *Politics, Prosperity, and Peace* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).

8. See Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Belieft, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

9. See Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf, 1997); and Robert Kagan, "China's No. 1 Enemy," *New York Times*, May 11, 1999, 23(A).

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12. Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Daiyu Islands," *International Security* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/99).

13. Lampton, 15-16.

14. Lampton, 14.

15. Lampton, 14.

16. Erik Eckholm, "Bombings May Have Hardened China's Line," *New York Times*, May 18, 1999, 11 (A).

17. Michael Wines, "Political Muscle: The Only Good Enemy Is a Strong/Weak Enemy: Straining to See the Real Russia," *New York Times*, May 2, 1999, I (D).

18. Jacob Heilbrunn, "As the Kremlin Turns," *New Republic*, June 7, 1999, 17.
19. Celestin Bohlen, "New Distrust Clouds Talks between U.S. and Moscow," *New York Times*, June 13, 1999, 29(A); Michael Wines, "Muscovites Savor a Caper after Being Down So Long," *New York Times*, June 15, 1999, 19(A).
20. Quoted in Bohlen.
21. Paul Volcker, "The Art of Central Banking: How Can It Solve Financial Crisis?" Annual Arnold Harberger Lecture on Economic Development, UCLA, February 19, 1999.
22. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998).