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**PS 134**  
**Foreign Policy Decision Making**

Winter 2015  
TTh 9:30 – 10:45am  
Dodd 170

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**Class web site:**

<https://moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/15W-POLSCI134-1>

This class focuses on decision making approaches to the explanation of foreign policy. We will discuss the rational actor model and its limitations, the implications of cognitive processes, group and organizational dynamics, and the role of situational factors in foreign policy analysis. Historical cases will be discussed throughout. The course will also introduce you more broadly to purposive explanation and its limitations in the social sciences and the discussion and reading will thus draw upon work in economics, sociology, psychology, as well as philosophy.

**Requirements:** Regular attendance at lectures and sections, knowledgeable participation, course readings, a midterm, and a final paper (based solely on course readings).

**Books available for purchase at the UCLA book store:**

Mann, Jim. 2012. *The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power*. New York: Viking.

Stein, Arthur A. 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

All the other assigned readings are downloadable either directly from UCLA, usually through JSTOR, or from the list of links page on the course website. Note that I may make small changes in reading assignments during the quarter.

Your final paper will pick some policy discussed in the Mann book and assess whether the decision and the policy process reflected the criteria of rationality discussed in the course. Did the decision reflect a rational decision making process or did it result from defective decision making? The criteria that define rationality and its shortcomings constitute the focus of the lectures and the readings. In the paper you will be applying the analytical tools of the course to a foreign policy decision of the Obama administration..

You will use the Mann book and any assigned articles to provide you the information with which to answer the question. Focus on the descriptions he provides of meetings and decisions. Take notes as you read. You will find that you will have to reread portions, especially as you learn new perspectives throughout the quarter. Remember, when you write you will have to cite specifics. You will have to marshal evidence from the reading to make your case. The readings during the quarter provide many examples of authors supporting or attacking different analytic claims based on historical case materials.

The paper should be approximately 15 pages, double-spaced, 1-inch margins, 12 point Times New Roman font. This total does not include title page and notes (whether endnotes or footnotes). Cite your sources, and make certain to provide page references to material you draw upon. You can use any citation style you like (in-line, footnotes, endnotes), but do not include them in your page count.

**The completed paper is tentatively due Wednesday, March 18, 2015, 5pm.**

For fun, at some point after the first few weeks in the quarter, rent and see the movie *Thirteen Days*. In conjunction with the movie, read Philip Brenner, "Turning History on its Head," which you can find at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba\\_mis\\_cri/brenner.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/brenner.htm)

## 1. Introduction

### 2-4. Rational Actor Model

Read these articles for their use of the rational actor model, and for how they explain decisions to use force or threaten the use of force.

Allison, Graham T. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 10-38.

Farrar, L. L., Jr. 1972. The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16: 1-23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173273>

Hampson, Fen Osler. 1984. The Divided Decision Maker: American Domestic Politics and the Cuban Crisis. *International Security* 9 (3): 130-165. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538590>

McKeown, Timothy J. 2000. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Politics as Usual. *Journal of Politics* 62 (1): 70-87. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647598>

Logevall, Frederik. 2004. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (1): 100-112. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552566>

Burgos, Russell A. 2008. Origins of regime change: "Ideapolitik" on the long road to Baghdad, 1993–2000. *Security Studies* 17 (2): 221-256.

Bluth, Christoph. 2004. The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq. *International Affairs* 80 (5): 871-892. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569476>

Record, Jeffrey. 2008. Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq: Making Strategy after 9/11. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 63-92. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Summer/record.pdf>

Woods, Kevin, James Lacey and Murray Williamson. 2006. Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside. *Foreign Affairs* 85 (3): 2-26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031964>

This paper summarizes a larger project. Only some of this article is directly relevant to the issue of Iraqi decisionmaking. You may prefer to read chapters 1 and 2 in

Woods, Kevin M., Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey. 2006. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A view of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's senior leadership*. Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis.

Begin reading Mann, *The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power*.

## 5. The National Interest

- Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly* 67, 4 (December): 481-502. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145138>
- Wolfers, Arnold. 1964. The Goals of Foreign Policy. In *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 67- 80.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1978. *Defending the national interest: raw materials investments and U.S. foreign policy*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 5-54.
- Rosenau, James N. 1968. National Interest. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David L. Sills, 11:34-11:40. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.

## 6-8. Strategic Interaction: Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken

- Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, pp. 3-24.
- Snyder, Glenn H. 1971. 'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 15: 66-103. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013593>
- Jervis, Robert. 1976. Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 58-111. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, pp. 25-54.
- Morton, Louis. 1987. Japan's decision for war. In *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield, 99-124. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army.
- Keep reading Mann, *The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power*.

## 9-10. Strategic Interaction: Deterrence and Influence

- Luard, Evan. 1967. Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and Postwar Years. *World Politics* 19: 167-89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009609>
- Alexandroff, Alan, and Richard Rosecrance. 1977. Deterrence in 1939. *World Politics* 29: 404-24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010003>
- Russett, Bruce M. 1967. Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory. *Journal of Peace Research* 4, no. 2: 89-105. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/423240>
- Russett, Bruce M. 1963. The Calculus of Deterrence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7: 97-109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172796>
- Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, pp. 113-150.
- Keep reading Mann, *The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power*.

**11-12. Cognition and Constraints to Rationality**

- Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. The Science of "Muddling Through." *Public Administration Review* 19: 79-88. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/973677>
- Anderson, Paul A. 1983. Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28: 201-22. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2392618>
- Anderson, Paul A. 1981. Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision Making. *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (4): 738-761. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110761>
- Snyder, Jack L. 1978. Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence. *World Politics* 30: 345-65. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009870>
- Kahneman, Daniel and Jonathan Renshon. 2007. Why Hawks Win. *Foreign Policy*, January-February. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25462124>
- Levy, Jack S. 1992. An introduction to prospect theory. *Political Psychology* 13, no. 2: 171-86. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791677>
- Haas Mark L. 2001. Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2): 241-270. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096110>
- Johnson, Dominic D. P. and Dominic Tierney. 2011. The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return. *International Security* 36(1): 7-40. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41289687>
- Houghton, David Patrick. 2008. Invading and Occupying Iraq: Some Insights From Political Psychology. *Peace and Conflict* 14(2): 169-192.

**13-14. Group Decision Making: Problems of Aggregation & Groupthink**

- Janis, Irving L. 1982. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, pp. 2-13, 174-177, 242-259.
- Hermann, Charles F., Janice Gross Stein, Bengt Sundelius and Stephen G. Walker. 2001. Resolve, Accept, or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions. *International Studies Review* 3 (2): 133-168. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186567>
- Yetiv, Steve A. 2003. Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis. *British Journal of Political Science* 33: 419-442. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092305>
- Badie, Dina. 2010. Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6(4): 277-296.
- Kramer, Roderick M. 1998. Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time? *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 73 (2-3): 236-271.

**15. Bureaucratic Politics**

- Allison, Graham T., and Morton H. Halperin. 1972. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications. *World Politics* 24: 40-79. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010559>
- Mitchell, David and Tansa George Massoud. 2009. Anatomy of Failure: Bush's Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5(3): 265-286.

- McKeown, Timothy J. 2001. Plans and Routines, Bureaucratic Bargaining, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *Journal of Politics* 63:1163-1190. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2691811>
- Krasner, Stephen. 2008. Policy-Making and Academic Research: Why Wisdom May Not Result in Action. Bridging the Gap, Working Paper # 1, The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas, Austin. <https://strausscenter.org/images/pdf/krasnerbtgpaper.pdf>

## 16. Misperception

- Jervis, Robert. 1968. Hypotheses on Misperception. *World Politics* 20: 454-79. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009777>
- White, Ralph K. 1970. Misperception as a Cause of Two World Wars. In *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars*, 3-33. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books.
- Duelfer, Charles A. and Stephen Benedict Dyson. 2011. Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience. *International Security* 36 (1): 73-100. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41289689>
- Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, pp. 55-86.

## 17. Crisis

- Hermann, Charles F. 1969. International Crisis as a Situational Variable. In *International Politics and Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. Ed. James N. Rosenau, 409-21. New York: Free Press.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1962. Cause, Surprise, and No Escape. *Journal of Politics* 24: 3-22. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2126735>
- Monten, Jonathan and Andrew Bennett. 2010. Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990-91 Gulf War. *Security Studies* 19 (3): 486-520.

## 18. History

- MacDonald, Scot. 2002. Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13 (4): 29-59.
- Record, Jeffrey. 2007. The Use and Abuse of History: Munich, Vietnam and Iraq. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 49 (1): 163-180.

## 19. Conclusion

- Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate*, pp. 172-210.