

**Selected Topics in International Relations:
Domestic Politics, Political Economy, and Grand Strategy**

Political Science 239

Fall 2022

Thursday, 2:00-4:50 pm, 4276 Bunche Hall

Office hours: To be arranged

Draft Syllabus Vers. 1.3 (Subject to revision)

Professor Arthur Stein

For a Prince should have two fears:
one within, on account of his subjects;
the other outside, on account of external powers.
— Niccolò Machiavelli

Course description.

The primacy of foreign threats and the expectation of a unified singular state response to the international environment is the presumption of structural arguments of international politics. Yet rulers can be domestically constrained from pursuing what they see as the optimal response to international threats and opportunities. Rulers may also adopt policies because of domestic considerations, their international implications notwithstanding.

In each session we will discuss concerns of domestic politics and political economy that affect what would otherwise be a foreign policy solely shaped by international threats and opportunities. In the case of each session, we will discuss whether the kinds of internal considerations that affect grand strategy work similarly in autocracies as they do in democracies.

The course is a research seminar. It should not distract but complement your research interest(s). There will be relatively light reading (100-125 pages/week) and the focus will be on analytics and theory rather than method and estimation. My expectation is that each participant will take some responsibility in crafting a class session and present their work/tentative interest in a class session.

Questions to be addressed will likely include: In what ways do revolutions, regime and leadership changes, and shifts in ruling coalitions affect a country's foreign policy? What are the foreign policy consequences of domestic political and economic instability? What are the foreign policy consequences of particularistic domestic interest groups? The converse focuses on the domestic challenges posed by a government's pursuit of what it views as in the national interest? How do financing considerations affect foreign policy? What are the extraterritorial consequences of ethnicity, religion and ideology? When do political leaders compromise/share national sovereignty by, for example, allowing other countries basing rights or inviting external interventions?

Which of these, or others, we focus on and to what degree will depend on the specific interests of the students in the course. Note that the question of how rulers square international pressures/opportunities with domestic constraints and requirements can be asked regarding many policies.

Note also that the issue of leaders dealing with both an internal and external environment is applicable to any organization, including corporate CEOs, mob bosses, and terrorist leaders.

1. Introductory meeting (Sept. 22, 2022)

A discussion of the focus of the course and its implications for understanding and explaining international relations. Personal introductions.

2. Introduction: Domestic politics, political economy, and grand strategy (Sept. 29, 2022)

Given the focus of this course, we begin by discussing what is grand strategy, the impact of political economy and domestic politics on it. Such work has gone by various labels: *innenpolitik* (a German literature that arose as an alternative to *realpolitik*), and second image arguments.

What is assumed by a systemic/structural perspective on international politics? What do such arguments assume about grand strategy/foreign policy? What do they assume about domestic politics and political economy?

2.1 On grand strategy

Balzacq, Thierry, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich. 2019. Introduction: Comparing Grand Strategies in the Modern World. In *Comparative grand strategy: a framework and cases*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pages 1-11.

Lissner, Rebecca Friedman. 2018. What is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield. *Texas National Security Review* 2 (1): 52-73.

2.2 Political Economy of Grand Strategy

Kirshner, Jonathan. 1998. Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War. *Review of International Political Economy* 5(1): 64-91.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1998. Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship. *International Organization* 52(4): 825-854.

2.3 Domestic Politics of Grand Strategy

Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur A. Stein. 1993. Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy. In *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, edited by Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, 3-21. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Fearon, James D. 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 289-313.

Brawley, Mark R. 2010. A neoclassical realist interpretation of grand strategy. In *Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A neoclassical realist view*. Routledge Global Security Studies. New York: Routledge. Read pages 1-15.

3. Revolutions, regime changes, and grand strategy (Oct, 6, 2022)

Revolutions, regime changes, and changes in ruling coalitions result in changes of rulers or the institutional settings in which rulers operate or their bases of support. What are the international consequences of such domestic changes? For example, has a recent shift to authoritarianism in certain societies changed their foreign policy alignments? What are the mechanisms posited for their impact?

Nelson, Chad E. 2022. *Revolutionary Contagion and International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1-2. Read pages 1-25.

Colgan, Jeff D. and Jessica L.P. Weeks. 2015. Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict. *International Organization* 69(1): 163-194. Read pages 163-170. 190-191.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2002. Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. *International Organization* 56(2): 297-337. 297 to 306 or 309

Solingen, Etel. 2014. Domestic Coalitions, Internationalization, and War: Then and Now. *International Security* 39(1): 44-50, 58-70

Auerswald, David P. 1999. Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts. *International Organization* 53(3): 469-504. Read 469-481.

Oktay, Sibel. 2022. The Constraints and Opportunities of Coalition Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond the Dichotomy. In *Governing abroad: coalition politics and foreign policy in Europe*, 22-55. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. .

4. The International Consequences of Domestic Pressures and Constraints (Oct, 13, 2022)

The most common argument made is that domestic instability or illegitimacy leads rulers to use foreign policy crises to divert and distract, to generate supportive nationalist sentiment and a 'rally-round-the-flag effect'. A variant of this argument is that of domestic preferences for an assertive foreign policy press leaders to adopt policies they would otherwise eschew.

Is the nature of instability similar across political systems? Democracies can be subdivided into majoritarian parliamentary democracies, coalitional parliamentary democracies, and presidential democracies. Autocracies can be subdivided into military dictatorships, single-party dictatorships, personalist dictatorships, and monarchies. Is instability the same in these different systems?

There is a contrasting counterargument, that domestic instability leads to an internal focus and even a foreign policy of appeasement. Similarly, some have argued that weak governments with a legitimacy problem will use international agreements and membership in international institutions as a way of bolstering their position. Finally, what pressure does ontological insecurity create for states and their foreign policies?

4.1 Diversionary War

Dawisha, Aheed. 1985. Arab Regimes, Legitimacy and Foreign Policy. *The International Spectator* 20(2): 3-10.

Smith, Alastair. 1996. Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems. *International Studies Quarterly* 40(1):133-153.

Hagan, Joe D. 2017. Diversionary Theory of War in Foreign Policy Analysis. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*

4.2 Encapsulation and Appeasement

Trubowitz, Peter and Peter Harris. 2015. When States Appease: British Appeasement in the 1930s. *Review of International Studies* 41(2): 289-311.

4.3 Relieving pressure and legitimation through cooperation: Human Rights

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Kiyoteru Tsutsui and John W Meyer. 2008. International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties. *International sociology* 23(1): 115-141.

Ryckman, Kirssa Cline. 2016. Ratification as Accommodation? Domestic Dissent and Human Rights Treaties. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(4): 582-596.

4.4 Ontological Security

Mitzen, Jennifer and Kyle Larson. 2017. Ontological Security and Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*. Oxford University Press.

5. Distortions introduced by particularistic interests (Oct, 20, 2022)

Particularistic domestic interests can also distort a country's foreign policy and grand strategy. Such arguments have been made about economic pressures as well as particular foreign policy lobbies.

5.1 Particularistic Economic Interests

Narizny, Kevin. 2021. Economic Interests and Grand Strategy. In *The Oxford handbook of grand strategy*, edited by Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, 256-270. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brooks, Stephen G. 2013. Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace. *International Organization* 67(4): 863-888.

Abdelal, Rawi and Jonathan Kirshner. 1999. Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests. *Security Studies* 9(1-2): 119-156. Read pp. 119-122, 154-156.

5.2 Particularistic Ethnic Interests

Haney, Patrick J. 2010. Ethnic Lobbying in Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies*. Oxford University Press.

Smith, Tony. 2000. Introduction. In *Foreign attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy*, 1-18. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Everyone read pages 1-2, those with an interest in democratic theory may find the rest of the chapter of interest.

Smith, Tony. 2000. Three Historical Stages of Ethnic Group Influence. In *Foreign attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy*, 47-84. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Skim.

5.3 Particularistic Human Rights Interests

Franklin, James C. 2015. Human Rights Naming and Shaming: International and Domestic Processes. In *The Politics of Leverage in international relations: name, shame, and sanction*, edited by H. Richard Friman, 43-60. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

6. Economic pressures and constraints (~~Oct. 27, 2022~~, changed to Nov. 3, 2022)

The domestic economy poses pressures and constraints on the pursuit of a foreign policy. In some cases, the needs of a domestic economy create pressures for an expansive foreign policy. In general, governments confront an allocation choice between guns and butter.

6.1 Lateral pressure

North, Robert C. 1977. Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (4): 569–591. Read pp. 569-570, 578-591.

Colgan, Jeff D. 2021. Oil and Security: The Necessity of Political Economy. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6(1): oga008.

Meierding, Emily. 2016. Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth. *Security Studies* 25(2): 258-288. Read 258-282, 287-288.

6.2 Guns vs. butter

Poast, P. 2019. Beyond the “Sinew of War”: The Political Economy of Security as a Subfield. *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 223-239.

7. Domestic risks/costs of foreign policy (~~Nov. 3, 2022~~, changed to Nov. 10, 2022)

The choice of a foreign policy reflecting a national interest can pose domestic political risks and costs and the challenge of selling/justifying a policy at home. Foreign economic policies intending to maximize national wealth have generated both economic crises and domestic backlashes. Similarly, policies intended to deter other countries and sanction them come with domestic costs which pose a political challenge for rulers (think of Western responses to the Russian invasion on Ukraine). One implication is the need to sell/justify foreign policy, to inflate threats and oversell benefits.

7.1 Domestic challenges of globalization

Guriev, Sergei and Elias Papaioannou. 2022. The Political Economy of Populism. *Journal of Economic Literature* 60(3): 753-832. Read pages 767-773 (section 4 through 4.1.4), 779-784 (section 5 through 5.2.3), 784-785 (sect 5.2.4 on the US), 786 (sec 5.3 austerity, stop at 5.3.1), 789-790 (sec 5.4).

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash. *International Organization* 75(2): 464-494.

7.2 Domestic challenges of deterrence/compellence/sanctions

Cramer, Jane K. and A.Trevor Thrall. 2009. Introduction: Understanding Threat Inflation. In *American foreign policy and the politics of fear: threat inflation since 9/11*, edited by A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer. London; New York, NY: Routledge. Read pp. 1-11.

7.3 Domestic challenges of international organizations and law

Zvobgo, Kelebogile, Wayne Sandholtz and Suzie Mulesky. 2020. Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(4): 785-797.

8. Domestic Politics and Political Economy of War (Nov. 10, 2022)

Waging war poses political as well as economic costs, and thus can affect the ways wars are waged and financed. There is, for example, an argument that the US public is averse to casualties and that this shapes leaders' decisions about intervention and strategy. A similar sort of argument is currently being made about the Russian government's use of the "military operations" label rather than calling it a war in Ukraine. In addition, a concern for public support also shapes decisions about how to finance wars.

8.1 Casualty Aversion

Smith, Hugh. 2005. What Costs Will Democracies Bear? A Review of Popular Theories of Casualty Aversion. *Armed forces & society* 31(4): 487-512.

Lorell, Mark A., Charles T. Kelley, Jr. and Deborah R. Hensler. 1985. *Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Summary, Pages v-x.

8.2 War finance

Cappella Zielinski, Rosella. 2016. *How States Pay for Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pages 1-28, 107-120.

Cappella Zielinski, Rosella. 2021. Financing the Grand Strategy of Great and Rising Powers. In *The Oxford handbook of grand strategy*, edited by Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, 422-437. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

9. Extended preferences: the impact of ideology, ethnicity, and religion (Nov. 17, 2022)

Religion, ethnicity, and ideology all can shape/distort foreign policy as societies and their governments try to export their preferences or assist like-minded others abroad.

Stein, Arthur A. 2017. Ethnicity, Extraterritoriality, and International Conflict. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40 (12): 2020-2038.

Balzacq, Thierry and Pablo Barnier-Khawam. 2021. Ideas and Ideology in Grand Strategy. In *The Oxford handbook of grand strategy*, edited by Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, 159-172. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

10. Domestic bases for Compromised sovereignty (Dec. 1, 2022)

Rulers facing certain challenges will opt for assistance from other countries in order to maintain themselves in power. They may willingly cede the autonomy and even independence their people and they want simply to remain in power.

10.1 Foreign military presence

Schmidt, Sebastian. 2014. Foreign Military Presence and the Changing Practice of Sovereignty: A Pragmatist Explanation of Norm Change. *American Political Science Review* 108(4): 817-829.

Yeo, Andrew I. 2017. The Politics of Overseas Military Bases. *Perspectives on Politics* 15(1): 129-136.

10.2 Invited intervention

Nolte, Georg. 2010. Intervention By Invitation. In *Max Planck encyclopedia of public international law*, 1-8. Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law.

Fox, Gregory H. 2015. Intervention By Invitation. In *The Oxford handbook of the use of force in international law*, edited by Marc Weller, 816-840. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

10.3 Shared sovereignty

10.4 Conditionality and Hypothecation