

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CORE SEMINAR I: International Relations Theory

Political Science 220A

Fall 2019

Wed. 2-4:50 pm, 4276 Bunche Hall

Office hours: Fri 10:00 am – 12 pm, and by appt.

<https://moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/19F-POLSCI220A-1>

Syllabus Vers. 1.0 (Interim, subject to revision)

Professor Arthur Stein

Course description. This is a graduate introduction to international relations theory. You will be introduced to the disparate substantive concerns, analytic approaches, schools of thought, theoretical perspectives, explanatory arguments, styles of research and methodologies to be found in the subfield. You will gain a sense of the breadth, the hyperpluralism, of the field. You will find that some of the readings will have approaches, and especially methods, with which you are unfamiliar. In fact, there are some papers you will have trouble reading. Do the best you can, and read around material you cannot follow. You will thereby learn what areas of illiteracy you have (and this can help guide you in future course selection) and you will develop the skill of understanding an argument without knowing everything that went in its construction. At the end, you will know a lot about international relations theory, but you will also have a good sense of what you don't know. You may find that we will not pay enough attention to those approaches you like and spend too much time on work you don't like. You may even experience frustration by the fact that no one particular approach is pushed in the course. You will be better able to choose the portions of the field you find appealing and the sets of skills you still need to attain in order to specialize in those areas.

Think of the following questions as you read. What do the authors want to explain (the dependent variable for social scientists, the explanandum or effect for others)? What explains the phenomenon in question (the independent variable, explanans, or cause)? From what theoretical perspective does the argument originate? How are cause and effect conceptualized? How are cause and effect observed? How are observations selected for analysis? What kind of research design is employed? With whom are the authors engaged in debate? The readings present competing theories and the approaches and arguments they embody, and provide examples of different strategies of demonstration and assessment.

You should think of yourselves as apprentices learning about a field and its practices. Although your primary focus is on the specific arguments developed in the works you read, you should keep an eye on as much else as possible. In what journals does work appear? Do different styles of work appear in different journals (some day you will be an author thinking about where to submit your work)? Who and what is cited? What distinguishes works you like from those that you don't? Are there any stylistic devices you like? For example, does the author elucidate candidate explanations at the beginning or unveil them sequentially? How does the author prepare you for what is going to transpire in the course of your reading the work? . . .

This is a draft syllabus (a beta version), changes may be made and you will receive updates.

Course requirements: Participation, four short papers, and a research proposal.

Participation: Please come to each class session and come prepared.

Bi-weekly memos: Every other week write a brief memo on one of the assigned readings (I will create a Doodle sign up so each person does a different paper and so that half the course is writing each week). You will upload your memo to a Box folder where other class participants will have access to it. For the reading you are discussing identify:

- What is the research question?
- What is the theoretical argument?
- What is the unit of analysis? (That is, the attributes and behavioral outcomes of what actors are in play: individual, groups, states, non-state actors, international systems.)
- What evidence is provided to support the argument?
- Why is the argument important?
- What is one major critique of the argument?

Research design: By the end of exam week (Dec. 13, 2019), you must submit a 10 page research design. This document should achieve the following tasks:

- Identify a research question and explain why it matters
- Briefly situate the question within the relevant existing literature
- Outline a theoretical argument
- Provide a plan for how you would collect evidence to support your argument
- Address two possible critiques or counter-arguments

Your research design may address any of the substantive topics covered in the course. You may also choose a different topic, subject to approval. *You must have your topic approved by Thanksgiving.*

SCHEDULE

1. Introductory Meeting: The Field (Oct. 2, 2019)
NO CLASS (Oct. 9, 2019)
2. Anarchy, Power, and the Balance of Power (Oct. 16, 2019)
3. Strategic Choice and War (Oct. 23, 2019)
4. Military Doctrine, Grand Strategy, and Weapons (Oct. 30, 2019)
5. Domestic Politics (Nov. 6, 2019)
6. Domestic Institutions and Individual Decision-making (Nov. 13, 2019)
7. International Political Economy and Networks (Nov. 20, 2019)
8. International Institutions (Nov. 27, 2019)
9. Ideas, Ideologies, and Social Constructions (Dec. 4, 2019)
10. International Bases of Domestic Politics and Domestic Conflict (Dec. 11, 2019)

1. Introductory Meeting: The Field (Oct. 2, 2019), ≈ 113pp.)

The readings demonstrate that the field of international relations tends to be quite self-conscious about what demarcates the field, what kind of theorizing is appropriate, what questions should be addressed, and what methods are most appropriate. Moreover, as I will develop more fully in class, international relations is affected both by developments in the real world and in the world of scholarship. The field has grappled with changes in technology, in the distribution of power, changes in domestic governance arrangements, and so on. It has also incorporated methodological changes as well as scholarly developments. After a lecture on the evolution of the field, we will have personal introductions.

Kahler, Miles. 1997. Inventing international relations: international relations theory since 1945. In *New thinking in international relations theory*, edited by Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 20-53. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lake, David A. 2011. Why “isms” Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress. *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 465-480.

Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. 2013. Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing is Bad for International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 19 (3): 427-457.

Reiter, Dan. 2015. Should We Leave Behind the Subfield of International Relations?. *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (1): 481-499.

Colgan, JD. 2016. Where is International Relations Going? Evidence From Graduate Training. *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (3): 486-498.

2. Anarchy, Power, and the Balance of Power (Oct. 9, 2019, ≈ 325pp.)

The field of international relations begins with a conception of states interacting in an anarchic interstate system. It focuses on the relative power of states and the distribution of power in the system. This generates a particular view of international conflict and cooperation.

The perspective, realism, has many variants: neorealism, structural realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism, defensive realism, etc. What are realism and neorealism? What are offensive and defensive realism?

What is assumed in these arguments? What is being explained? What is not being explained? Are they explanatory theories or normative injunctions? What is meant by anarchy? What does it imply? What is the role of intention? What constitutes change? What kind of empirical work can be done to assess these arguments (i.e., what is the research program?)? Does economics provide an appropriate analogue for these theories? What do these arguments say about the economy? Is realism a theory of war, peace, or both? Are some arguments specific to security and others to foreign economic policy?

Realism constitutes a particular systems theory. What is a system? What is a systems theory? Cannot a systems theory also be a theory of foreign policy?

There are alternative ways to characterize international systems and alternative arguments about how to measure power and about the consequences of the distribution of power. Compare hegemonic and balance of power arguments. How can scholars characterize the same historical period as both hegemonic and bipolar? What is the difference between assuming an anarchic international system, a hierarchical one, and an international society?

2.1 Anarchy, Power and Order

Eckstein, Arthur M. 2006. Realist Paradigms of Interstate Behavior. In *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*, chap. 2, 12-36. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Elman, Colin and Michael A. Jensen. 2014. Introduction. In *Realism Reader*, edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, 1-30. New York: Routledge.

2.2 Systems Theory

Jervis, Robert. 1979. Systems theories and diplomatic history. In *Diplomacy: new approaches in history, theory, and policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, read pp.≈ 212-226. New York: Free Press.

2.3 Balance of Power

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. Peace, war, and the balance of power. *American Political Science Review* 88 (September): 593-607.

Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. Testing balance-of-power theory in world history. *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2): 155-185. SKIM

2.4 Unipolarity

Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno and William C. Wohlforth. 2009. Introduction: Unipolarity, state behavior, and systemic consequences. *World Politics* 61 (1): 1-27.

2.5 Measuring Power

Beckley, Michael. 2018. The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters. *International Security* 43 (2): 7-44.

2.6 Alliances

Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. *World Politics* 36 (4): 461-495.

Olson, Mancur, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. An economic theory of alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48: 266-79. Reprinted in *Economic theories of international politics*, ed. Bruce M. Russett, and in *Alliance in international politics*, ed. Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen, and Steven Rosen.

2.7 Hegemony

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Limits of hegemonic stability theory. *International Organization* 39 (Autumn): 579-614.

2.8 Hierarchy

Lake, David A. 2009. Hobbesian Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 263-283.

2.9 International Society

Buzan, Barry, David Held, and Anthony McGrew. 1998. Realism vs cosmopolitanism: a debate. *Review of International Studies* 24 (July): 387-98.

Buzan, Barry. 1993. From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school. *International Organization* 47 (Summer): 327-52. start with the bottom of p. 330, quit at middle of p. 350

3. Strategic Choice and War (Oct. 16, 2019, ≈ 310 pp.)

Strategic interaction characterizes international relations. What are the implications of a strategic-choice approach to politics and international relations? What is the bargaining model of war and what are its implications? Is conflict rational? Is cooperation?

3.1 A Strategic-Choice Approach

Lake, David A., and Robert Powell. 1999. International relations: a strategic-choice approach. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, 3-38. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Morrow, James D. 1999. The strategic setting of choices: signaling, commitment, and negotiation in international politics. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, 77-114. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

3.2 Cooperation Under Anarchy

Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The emergence of cooperation among egoists. *American Political Science Review* 75: 306-18.

3.3 Rational Wars

Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli. 2009. The Reasons for Wars: an Updated Survey. In *Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, edited by Chris Coyne. Elgar Publishing, revised typescript, December.

Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. *International Organization* 49: 379-414. Skim, this will be more fully discussed in 220B.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2000. Rationalist Explanations for War? *Security Studies* 10 (1): 143-50.

Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a commitment problem. *International Organization* 60 (1): 169-203. Skim, this will be more fully discussed in 220B.

O'Neill, Barry. 1999. Commitments Based on Honor. In *Honor, Symbols, and War*, 127-138. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

3.4 Bargaining

Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory. *World Economics* 1: 145-166.

Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *International Organization* 52: 269-305.

3.5 Diplomacy and Signals

Katagiri, Azusa and Eric Min. 2019. The Credibility of Public and Private Signals: A Document-Based Approach. *American Political Science Review* 113 (1): 156-172.

3.6 Limitations ?

Stein, Arthur A. 1999. The limits of strategic choice: constrained rationality and incomplete explanation. In *Strategic choice and international relations*, edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, 197-228. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

3.7 Agent-based models

4. Military Doctrine, Grand Strategy, and Weapons (Oct. 23, 2019, ≈ 319 pp.)

Assuring security is a primary objective of states and as a result they maintain militaries and prepare for the possibility of war. What is grand strategy and what are the set of grand strategic choices states make? What are the military strategies states employ? Why do the weak wage war on the strong? How is war waged? How do wars end? Who wins wars? Do advances in military technology change the nature of warfare and the exercise of coercion? This has been asked of nuclear weapons and what they imply and why states want them? Currently, similar questions are being asked about drones and cyber technology.

4.1 Security Dilemma and Deterrence

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 58-113.

4.2 Status

Larson, Deborah Welch and Alexei Shevchenko. 2010. Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy. *International Security* 34 (4): 63-95. Read pages 63-76 and 93-95 and ignore the footnotes.

Renshon, Jonathan. 2016. Status Deficits and War. *International Organization* 70 (3): 513-550.

4.3 Grand Strategy: Appeasement, Engagement, Deterrence, Containment, Rollback, Offshore balancing

4.4 Offensive/Defense Balance

Adams, Karen Ruth. 2003. Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-deterrence Balance. *International Security* 28 (3): 45-83.

4.5 Military Strategy: Attrition, Envelopment, Airpower

Reiter, Dan and Curtis Meek. 1999. Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903-1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test. *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 363-387.

4.6 Covert vs Overt

4.7 Terrorist Strategies

4.8 War Termination

Ramsay, Kristopher W. 2008. Settling it on the Field: Battlefield Events and War Termination. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (6): 850-879.

4.9 Who Wins Wars?

Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Introduction. In *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-13.

Bendor, Jonathan and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2019. Historical Contingencies in the Evolution of States and Their Militaries. *World Politics* 71 (1): 126-161.

4.10 Weapons and War

4.11 The Nuclear Revolution

Sechser, Todd S. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail. *International Organization* 67 (1): 173-195.

4.12 Nuclear Proliferation

Sagan, Scott D. 2011. The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. *Annual review of political science* 14: 225-244.

4.13 Reputation

Weisiger, Alex and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2015. Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics. *International Organization* 69 (2): 473-495.

5. Domestic Politics (Oct. 30, 2019, ≈ 310 pp.)

How does domestic politics impact foreign policy? What are the features of domestic politics that matter? How does domestic society impact foreign policy? How is society characterized? Is it a whole or composed of pieces? Along what lines is society divided? What are the societal factors emphasized in the articles? What are the roots of the interests of different subdivisions? Whose interests does policy reflect when society is divided? What are the links between society and the state? Where is government in these models? Are studies of internal sources the sound of one hand clapping (i.e., do they ignore the inter-state component of foreign policy and international relations)? Do these articles provide comparable explanations of security and foreign economic policy? Can all the factors discussed be applied in both domains? Are domestic sources more important in one domain than another? Why? Do differences in political systems, as between democracies and autocracies, affect foreign policy and the likelihood of war? What is the democratic peace and what explains it?

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2012. Domestic Explanations of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 161-181.

5.1 Regime Type: Democracies and Autocracies (Regime Security and Democratic Peace)

Gowa, Joanne. 1995. Democratic states and international disputes. *International Organization* 49 (Summer): 511-22.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. *International Organization* 53: 233-66.

Colgan, Jeff D. and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2015. Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict. *International Organization* 69 (1): 163-194.

5.2 Domestic Audiences

Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review* 88 (September): 577-92.

Snyder, Jack and Erica D. Borghard. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 437-456.

Kenneth A. Schultz. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (1): 32-60.

5.3 Political Parties

Trager, Robert, F. and Lynn Vavreck. 2011. The political costs of crisis bargaining: Presidential rhetoric and the role of party. *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 526-545. Skim, this will be more fully discussed in 220B.

Bertoli, Andrew, Allan Dafoe and Robert F. Trager. 2019. Is There a War Party? Party Change, the Left-Right Divide, and International Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (4): 950-975.

5.4 State/Society

Katzenstein, Peter. 1977. Conclusion: domestic structures and strategies of foreign economic policy. *International Organization* 31 (Autumn): 879-920. SKIM

5.5 Interests and Coalitions

Kurth, James R. 1979. The political consequences of the product cycle: industrial policy and political outcomes. *International Organization* 33 (Winter): 1-34. SKIM

Solingen, Etel. 2007. Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The foundations of war and peace in East Asia and the Middle East. *American Political Science Review* 101 (November): 757-780.

6. Domestic Institutions and Individual Decision-making (Nov. 6, 2019, ≈ 328pp.)

Foreign policy is made by political institutions. Does the process of decision making affect foreign policy? Is process a description or an explanation? Is there a decision making theory? Why the need to focus on process rather than purpose? What does it mean for outcomes to be dependent upon process or to be determined by process?

Why is the state being disaggregated? Does disaggregating the state require the shift to a decision making approach? Does disaggregating the state require abandoning the rational actor model? Are process arguments about imperfect information or decentralization? What are the relevant actors? Is there a theory of institutions? If we explain foreign policy by use of decision making models, what is the basis for distinguishing international relations as a subfield (i.e., what makes foreign policy different than other policy domains)? Is foreign policy a different issue area? Why? Don't all domestic policies have foreign consequences?

Foreign policy is also made by individuals. How do scholars demonstrate the explanatory utility of an individual-level approach? Is the appropriate level of analysis the individual or the group? What is the basis for deciding? Are these arguments universal or contextual? Does context act as a trigger? What is the role of beliefs? Are they driven by motives or not? Do contexts or actors define situations? Are crises inherent in a situation? Can you tell what is or is not a crisis? Is more information always better? Must our explanations of individual behavior conform to individuals' understanding of their situation, and to their explanations for their choices? What does the problem of cyclical majorities imply for the way we should go about explaining international politics (does it demand a unitary actor model)? Why are psychological studies self-falsifying (cf., economic arguments self-fulfilling)?

6.1 Bureaucratic Politics

6.2 Organizational Culture

Legro, Jeffrey W. 1996. Culture and preferences in the international cooperation Two-step. *American Political Science Review* 90: 118-37.

6.3 Public Opinion

Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B. K. Potter. 2008. The relationships between mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis. *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 39-65.

6.4 Issue Areas

Lowi, Theodore J. 1967. Making democracy safe for the world: national politics and foreign policy. In *Domestic sources of foreign policy*, ed. James N. Rosenau, 295-331. Reprinted in *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, 1979).

6.5 Two-level games

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 2-Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.

6.6 Individuals as Actors

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The war trap*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 11-18.

Kertzer, Joshua D. and Dustin Tingley. 2018. Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms. *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 319-339.

Horowitz, Michael C. and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2018. Studying Leaders and Military Conflict Conceptual Framework and Research Agenda. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (10, SI): 2072-2086. Read pages 2074-2080.

6.7 Heterogenous Leaders

Etheridge, Lloyd. 1978. Personality effects on American foreign policy, 1898-1968: a test of interpersonal generalization theory. *American Political Science Review* 72: 434-51.

Yarhi-Milo, Keren, Joshua D. Kertzer and Jonathan Renshon. 2018. Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (10, SI): 2150-2179.

6.8 Social Psychological Theories of Attitude Change

6.9 Cognitive Process

Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. *American economic review* 93 (5): 1449-1475.

Gronich, Lori Helene. 2017. Expertise and Naïveté in Decision-Making: Theory, History, and the Trump Administration. *H-Diplo ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond*, May 3. <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5AH.pdf>.

6.10 Belief Systems

Renshon, Jonathan. 2008. Stability and change in belief systems: the operational code of George W. Bush. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (6): 820-849. Read pages 820-833.

6.11 Leader Tenure (Experience)

Smith, Bradley C. and William Spaniel. 2019. Militarized Disputes, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (5): 1222-1252.

6.12 Threat Perception

Stein, Janice Gross. 2013. Threat Perception in International Relations. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd edn., edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6.13 Crisis Situations

Hermann, Charles F. 1969. International crisis as a situational variable. In *International politics and foreign policy*, 2nd edn., ed. James N. Rosenau, 409-21. New York: Free Press.

7. International Political Economy and Networks (Nov. 13, 2019, ≈ 301 pp.)

The subfield of international political economy focuses on the cross-border movement of inputs to production (capital and labor) and the resulting products (trade). Arguments drawn from international relations more broadly have been applied to international economic relations. But economic theories have also been used as backdrops to explaining outcomes. Why? What do the economic theories provide? Why have cross-border movements increased? What are the implications of a growth in economic interdependence (globalization)?

Social network analysis has emerged as a technique for studying the connections/interactions of actors. What alternative conceptualizations and explanations does it provide?

7.1 Economic Interdependence

Cooper, Richard N. 1972. Economic interdependence and foreign policy in the seventies. *World Politics* 24: 159-81.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Realism and Complex Interdependence. In *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, pp. 23-37. Boston: Little, Brown.

7.2 Trade

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347.

Stein, Arthur A. 1984. The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order. *International Organization* 38 (Spring): 355-386.

Goldstein, Judith. 1986. The political economy of trade: institutions of protection. *American Political Science Review* 80 (March): 161-84.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1121-1137.

7.3 Finance

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. *International Organization* 45 (Autumn): 425-51.

7.4 Migration

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization. *World Politics* 67 (1): 114-154.

7.5 Sanctions

Stein, Arthur A. 2012. Sanctions, Inducements, and Market Power: Political Economy of International Influence. In *Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation*, edited by Etel Solingen, 29-55. New York: Cambridge University Press.

7.6 Social Conventions

7.7 Networks

Jervis, Robert. 1979. Systems theories and diplomatic history. In *Diplomacy: new approaches in history, theory, and policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, Read the rest, pp. ≈ 226-244.

Maoz, Zeev. 2012. How Network Analysis Can Inform the Study of International Relations. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29 (3): 247-256.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Miles Kahler and Alexander H. Montgomery. 2009. Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization* 63 (3): 559-592.

Kinne, Brandon J. 2013. Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 107 (4): 766-785.

8. International Institutions (Nov. 20, 2019, ≈ 312 pp.)

Why do states create international institutions? What role do they play in international politics? How are they designed? How do they differ? Why do states comply? Does law play a role in international politics and how does it compare to the role played by domestic law?

8.1 Why and How

Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization* 36 (2): 325-355. – SKIM

Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.

Stein, Arthur A. 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. *International Organization* 36 (2): 299-324. – SKIM

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics and Politics* 2 (1): 1-23.

Martin, Lisa L. 2017. International Institutions: Weak Commitments and Costly Signals. *International Theory* 9 (3): 353-380.

8.2 The Result

Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur A. Stein. 2001. The theory of overlapping clubs. In *The new great power coalition: toward a world concert of nations*, edited by Richard Rosecrance, 221-234. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

8.3 Design

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-799.

8.4 Legitimacy

Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and authority in international politics. *International Organization* 53: 379-408.

8.5 Compliance

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99: 611-622.

Kelley, Judith. 2007. Who keeps international commitments and why? The international criminal court and bilateral nonsurrender agreements. *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 573-589.

8.6 International Law and Courts

Johns, Leslie. 2015. *Strengthening International Courts: The Hidden Costs of Legalization*, chap. 2, pp. 13-40. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

8.7 Pathologies

Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization* 53 (4): 699-732.

9. Ideas and Ideology (Nov. 27, 2019, ≈ 314 pp.)

The concepts and structures you have read about are social constructions. This raises the role of ideas. What role do ideas play, and are they the basis for change, in international politics? Do argument and persuasion play a role in international politics? Are there international norms and moral principles and what role do they play? What are the implications of social constructions for international politics?

9.1 Social Constructions

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of state politics. *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. What makes the world hang together? neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization* 52: 855-885.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4): 887-917.

Finnemore, Martha. 2003. *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Read Chapters 1, "The Purpose of Force" (pp. 1-23), and pages 24-27 of Chapter 2, "Sovereign Default and Military Intervention".

Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59 (Winter): 39-75.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1995/96. Compromising Westphalia. *International Security* 20, 3: 115-151.

March, James G., and Olsen Johan P. 1998. The institutional dynamics of international political orders. *International Organization* 52: 943-69.

9.2 Morality

Kreps, Sarah and Sarah Maxey. 2018. Mechanisms of Morality: Sources of Support for Humanitarian Intervention. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (8): 1814-1842.

9.3 Rhetoric, arguing

Risse, Thomas. 2000. "Let's argue!": Communicative action in world politics. *International Organization* 54 (1): 1-39.

Stein, Arthur A. 2000. The Justifying State: Why Anarchy Doesn't Mean No Excuses. In *Peace, Prosperity, and Politics*, edited by John Mueller, 235-255. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

10. International Bases of Domestic Politics and Domestic Conflict (Dec. 4, 2019, ≈ 278 pp.)

What is the second-image reversed and what challenge does it pose to domestic explanations of foreign policy (and to comparative politics?) What facets of politics have been given second-image explanations? What are the implications of diffusion for international politics and for our explanations of political phenomena? What determines the size of nations (and thus, the number of them as well)? Why the rise of secessionist movements and political fragmentation in an era also characterized by political integration? Why the rise of ethnic conflict and what explains it? Is ethnic conflict simply warfare and no different than inter-state war? What explains terrorism? If terrorists are extremists and everyone knows they are, then what strategy of victory guides their choices? Why would weak non-state actors who cannot achieve a military victory attack states, including the most powerful of states? What explains the rise of political violence against civilians? What explains the coalitions and alignments of groups fighting a civil war? How do civil wars end? Do they end on their own or are external powers and the international system critical to civil war termination?

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10.7 Alignment and Alliance

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10.8 International Politics and Civil War Termination

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